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Introduction
This dissertation thesis consists of three academic papers. Each paper repre-
sents a single chapter.
Chapter 1
This chapter is based on a joint paper with Nikolai Stähler published under
the title: Reforming the labor market and improving competitiveness: an analysis for
Spain using FiMod, SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Novem-
ber 2013, Vol. 4, Issue 4, 437-471. We analyse the macroeconomic effects of
labor market reforms in Spain and the spillovers to the rest of the euro area
using a two country monetary union DSGE model. My contribution was
to integrate endogenous job destruction into the model, which included the
derivation of the equations for the modified labor market structure, linking
the labor market block to the rest of the FiMod model and implementing the
model on the computer. I also performed the numerical simulations of the
labor market reforms and I contributed substantially to writing the paper.
Chapter 2
This chapter is based on a joint paper with Maik Wolters published under the
title: The macroeconomic effects of fiscal consolidation in dynamic general equilib-
rium, Kiel Working Papers, No. 1963, November 2014. We provide a thorough
assessment of the macroeconomic effects of fiscal consolidation in a dynamic
general equilibrium model for the US economy. My contribution was to de-
rive the model equations, to implement the model on the computer and to
perform most of the numerical simulations. I also contributed substantially
to writing the paper.
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Chapter 3
This chapter is based on my singled-authored paper published under the ti-
tle: Model pooling and changes in the informational content of predictors: an empir-
ical investigation for the euro area, Kiel Working Papers, No. 1982, January 2015. I
study the performance of single predictor bridge equation models as well as
a wide range of model selection and pooling techniques, including Mallows
model averaging and Cross-Validation model averaging, for short-term fore-
casting of euro area GDP growth. Moreover, I explore to what extent model
selection and model pooling techniques are able to outperform a simple au-
toregressive benchmark model in the periods before, during and after the
Great Recession.
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Chapter 1
Reforming the labor market and
improving competitiveness: an
analysis for Spain using FiMod
Abstract
This paper uses an extended version of “FiMod – A DSGEModel for Fiscal Pol-
icy Simulations” with endogenous job destruction decisions by private firms
to analyze the effects of several currently discussed labor market reforms on
the Spanish economy. The main focus is on the firms’ hiring and firing de-
cisions, on the implications for fiscal balances and on Spain’s international
competitiveness. We find that measures aiming at reducing (policy-induced)
outside option of workers, such as a decrease in unemployment benefits,
public wages or, to a lesser extent, public-sector employment, seem most ben-
eficial to foster output, employment, international competitiveness and fiscal
balances. Decreasing the unions’ bargaining power also accomplishes this
task. Our simulation suggests that reforming employment protection legis-
lation does not seem to be a suitable tool from the perspective of improving
international competitiveness. All measures imply (income) redistribution
between optimizing and liquidity-constrained consumers. Our analysis also
suggests that those reforms that are beneficial for Spain generate positive
spillovers to the rest of EMU, too.
Keywords: General equilibrium, fiscal policy simulations, labor market
reforms.
JEL-Codes: E24, E32, E62, H20, H50.
Reforming the labor market and improving competitiveness: an analysis for Spain
using FiMod, SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, November
2013, Vol. 4, Issue 4, 437-471.
DOI:10.1007/s13209-013-0100-8
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Chapter 2
The macroeconomic effects of
fiscal consolidation in dynamic
general equilibrium
Abstract
We provide a systematic analysis of fiscal consolidation in a dynamic general
equilibrium model. Fiscal consolidation leads to a persistent output contrac-
tion if the fiscal instrument affects production factors negatively as it is the
case for government investment cuts and labor and capital tax increases. For
a consolidation via government consumption, transfers or the consumption
tax rate output recovers faster. Credit-constrained households amplify over-
all output dynamics. Further, the welfare of credit-constrained households is
more adversely affected than welfare of unconstrained households. Finally,
when the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates binds the output costs
of fiscal consolidation increase substantially.
Keywords: Fiscal consolidation, government debt, distortionary taxes,
zero lower bound, welfare, monetary-fiscal policy interaction.
JEL-Codes: E32, E62, E63, H61, H62, H63.
The macroeconomic effects of fiscal consolidation in dynamic general equilibrium,
Kiel Working Papers, No. 1963, November 2014.
https://www.ifw-members.ifw-kiel.de/publications/the-
macroeconomic-effects-of-fiscal-1/KWP_1963.pdf
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2.1 Introduction
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis and the Great Recession, many
countries are facing substantial deficits and growing debt. As analysed in
the 16th Geneva Report on the World Economy (Buttiglione et al., 2014),
global debt-to-GDP continues to grow, while growth and inflation remain
low, raising concerns about the danger of new crises. This spurs the need
to consolidate public finances in order to bring down debt-to-GDP ratios.
When setting up specific fiscal consolidation plans, policymakers can gener-
ally choose from a wide range of possible fiscal instruments. However, to do
so in a meaningful way, they need to understand the specific effects of fiscal
consolidation via the different instruments. In this paper, we seek to broaden
this understanding by providing a comprehensive analysis of the transmis-
sion as well as the overall quantitative effects of fiscal consolidation via six
different fiscal instruments on key macroeconomic variables and on welfare.
The literature analyzing the consequences of fiscal consolidation in macroe-
conomic models is still in its early stage. However, a large related literature
studying the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus has developed in recent years.
While there is no agreement yet on the size of empirical fiscal multiplier
estimates (see e.g. the debate between Ramey (2011) and Perotti (2014)),
the key factors determining the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus, such as the
mix of spending instruments, the share of credit-constrained households, the
length of a binding zero lower bound (ZLB) on interest rates and the usage
of lump-sum or distortionary taxes to return the debt-to-GDP to its initial
level are well understood in theoretical models (see e.g. Cogan et al. (2010),
Drautzburg and Uhlig (2011) , and Christiano et al. (2011)).
Nonetheless, it would be misleading to assume that the effects of fiscal con-
solidation are just the mirror image of fiscal stimulus. First of all, fiscal stim-
ulus is a temporary policy change that leads to a return to the initial steady
state in the long run. On the contrary, the purpose of fiscal consolidation is to
bring down government debt permanently, i.e. to arrive at a new steady state
with a lower debt-to-GDP ratio. Such permanent changes in fiscal policy can
induce much larger effects than temporary changes as shown by Baxter and
King (1993) in a neoclassical model. Secondly, the ZLB on interest rates in-
fluences the effects of fiscal stimulus, where an increase in interest rates is
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delayed, quite differently than the effects of fiscal consolidation, where a de-
crease of interest rates is fully prevented.
Yet, purely empirical analyses of fiscal consolidation are inherently diffi-
cult because policy actions that lead to permanent changes in debt-to-GDP
ratios are difficult to identify. Moreover, it is very hard to differentiate be-
tween the effects of different fiscal instruments. Accordingly, empirical pa-
pers come to opposing results regarding the output effects of fiscal consoli-
dation. Giavazzi and Pagano (1990, 1996) and Alesina and Ardagna (2010)
find that consolidation is expansionary even in the short run, while others
(see e.g. Perotti (2012), Jordà and Taylor (2013) and Guajardo et al. (2014))
find that consolidation leads to a short-run output contraction.
We contribute to the literature by providing a systematic analysis of fis-
cal consolidation using a dynamic general equilibrium (DGE) model. This
setup—in contrast to purely empirical papers—allows us to analyze various
well defined scenarios. We can differentiate between the effects of different
fiscal instruments by using one instrument at a time to consolidate govern-
ment finances, while holding the others constant. In particular, we study
fiscal consolidation via government consumption, government investment,
transfers and taxes on consumption, labor and capital. Of course, the reli-
ability of our results depends on whether the transmission channels in our
model reflect reality. Therefore, we use a medium-scale DGE model with
a number of frictions which provides a framework that is able to replicate
many empirically observed business cycle dynamics. Specifically, the inclu-
sion of a share of credit-constrained households as well as a detailed fiscal
sector allow for a concise analysis of fiscal policy transmission.
We calibrate the model to the US economy along the empirical estimates
of Drautzburg and Uhlig (2011). Our simulations start from a debt-to-GDP
ratio of 70 percent which is the empirical average in the US from 1995 to 2013.
We simulate a reduction of the debt-to-GDP ratio of 10 percentage points to
return to the average pre-crisis level from 1995 to 2007. Fiscal instruments re-
act via fiscal feedback rules to the discrepancy between the actual and the tar-
geted debt-to-GDP ratio.1 In particular, expenditures decrease and tax rates
1In an earlier version of this paper (Schwarzmüller and Wolters (2014), available from
the authors upon request) we include simulations where the fiscal instruments are adjusted
exogenously and permanently, while the debt-to-GDP ratio adjusts endogenously. In that
version additional fiscal space is used to either increase transfers or decrease the labor tax
rate in the long run. The main results are, however, very similar to the setup of this paper
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increase to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio. Once the debt-to-GDP ratio has
been reduced, this decreases the interest rate payments of the government
and creates additional fiscal leeway in the long run. The simulations are run
under perfect foresight which implies that households and firms anticipate
not only the consolidation path but also the usage of additional long-run fis-
cal space and optimize their plans accordingly.
For the transmission of fiscal policy three aspects turn out to be very im-
portant. First, the short-run output effects depend crucially on how specif-
ically a fiscal instrument affects demand. While all fiscal instruments affect
the budget constraints of households and thus consumption and investment,
fiscal consolidation via government consumption and investment addition-
ally reduces the government spending component of GDP directly. Second,
the interaction of the fiscal instruments with private production factors mat-
ters. We find that short-run output costs are largest for consolidation via
government investment and taxes on labor and capital because the former
reduces the public capital stock which enters the private production function
and in turn lowers productivity of private factors, while the latter two in-
crease tax distortions. In all three cases the private or public capital stock de-
creases for some time which leads to a very persistent short- to medium-run
output reduction. For consolidations via government consumption, trans-
fers and the consumption tax rate, capital does not decrease and output re-
covers much faster from its short-run contraction. Differences in short-run
output costs between the fiscal instruments are amplified because the more
negative an instrument affects output, the larger is the adjustment of that
instrument in order to ensure a decrease in the debt-to-GDP ratio to com-
pensate the output contraction. Third, the presence of credit-constrained
households matters and fiscal consolidation has large distributional conse-
quences between credit-constrained and optimizing households. Consump-
tion of credit-constrained households drops directly if their budget constraint
tightens because of lower transfers, higher labor taxes or reductions in hours
worked caused by lower production. Optimizing households, by contrast,
can smooth consumption so that their demand changes less abruptly. Hence,
in the short run fiscal consolidation affects the consumption of credit-
constrained households much more negatively than of optimizing house-
where the debt-to-GDP target changes exogenously and fiscal instruments adjust endoge-
nously via feedback rules.
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holds. In the long run, credit-constrained households benefit most from fis-
cal consolidation. Additional fiscal space leads to higher long-run income
via lower taxes, increases in transfers or increases in labor income due to the
increased demand and production. In the case of credit-constrained house-
holds these increases in income are used completely for consumption. By
contrast, optimizing households need to split up additional income into con-
sumption and investment to support a higher capital stock that is needed to
achieve an increase in production in the new steady state.
Currently many governments do not only face high debt-to-GDP ratios.
Due to the widespread phenomenon of low economic growth in the after-
math of the global financial crisis the ZLB on nominal interest rates has be-
come binding. With our model we can analyse how the transmission of fiscal
consolidation changes if monetary policy cannot accommodate fiscal consoli-
dation measures. To do so we simulate a large recession similar to Christiano
et al. (2011) to obtain a binding ZLB on nominal interest rates and combine
this scenario with fiscal consolidation via different fiscal instruments. The
short-run output costs increase for two reasons. First, the real interest rate in-
creases so that output contracts more. Second, this makes a larger adjustment
of the fiscal instruments necessary to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio. We find
that the amplification of the short-run output costs through the ZLB is much
stronger for expenditure than for revenue based consolidations. However,
overall the instruments that lower productivity and increase tax distortions
still have the most negative short-run output effects.
While the policy debate on fiscal stimulus and fiscal consolidation mainly
focuses on the size of the fiscal multiplier, from an economic point of view the
effects on welfare are at least equally important. According to our analysis,
ranking the different fiscal consolidation strategies based on their welfare im-
pact, leads to substantially different results than ranking them based on their
output effects. Generally, the welfare effects of the various fiscal consolida-
tion instruments depend on the paths of consumption and leisure during the
transition and the final steady state. As an example, consider a consolidation
scenario with transfer cuts. If transfers are reduced to bring down the debt-
to-GDP ratio, the short-run output reduction is small, but the consumption of
credit-constrained households is highly negatively affected in the short-run
which leads to a large reduction in welfare of these during the transition to
the final steady state. Hence, one cannot simply derive conclusions regarding
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welfare from the literature on fiscal multipliers. Instead, additional welfare
analysis is necessary.
The most important fiscal instrument in the discussion on the size of the fis-
cal multiplier is government consumption (see e.g. Cogan et al. (2010)) which
is why we study the effects of a government consumption based fiscal consol-
idation in more detail. We find that the effects depend crucially on whether
government consumption provides utility to households as a substitute or
complement to private consumption. In particular, if private and public con-
sumption goods are complements then the short-run output costs and the
long-run benefits increase substantially. However, if private and public con-
sumption goods are substitutes, the short-run output costs decrease strongly
because private consumption increases to substitute for the decrease in pub-
lic consumption.
There are several other papers that are related to our analysis. For exam-
ple, Coenen et al. (2008) simulate fiscal consolidation in the euro area using
a two-country model for the euro area and the US. While they analyse one
instrument at a time, Cogan et al. (2013a,b) study consolidation plans for the
US that combine expenditure reductions by means of government consump-
tion and transfer payment cuts with reductions in distortionary taxes relative
to a baseline scenario of no consolidation. Incentives to work increase so that
hours and income increase in the long run. Consumption even increases in
the short run because households anticipate these developments and smooth
consumption over time. Similarly, Forni et al. (2010) find that consolidation
combined with permanent tax cuts is optimal because it has expansionary
effects in the short and long run. Erceg and Lindé (2013) study the effects of
fiscal consolidation in a currency union and when the ZLB on interest rates
is binding. In both cases monetary policy cannot freely adjust the interest
rate downwards which is why the short-run costs of fiscal consolidation in-
crease.2
2The above mentioned papers are closest to our analysis. Other papers study additional
aspects of fiscal consolidation. For example Corsetti et al. (2013), Roeger and in ’t Veld (2013)
and Philippopoulos et al. (2014) analyze the effects of fiscal consolidation on sovereign risk
premia, Stähler and Thomas (2012) include cuts in public employment and wages in the
analysis, Angeloni et al. (2014) study combined exit strategies from post-crisis fiscal and
monetary accommodations and account for their effects on financial stability, in ’t Veld (2013)
focusses on differences between euro area periphery and core countries, Almeida et al. (2013)
study small open economy aspects and welfare effects in an overlapping-generations model
and Carvalho and Martins (2011) study under which circumstances fiscal consolidation is
expansionary.
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In contrast to the above mentioned papers, we do not only study certain
specific aspects of fiscal consolidation but rather provide a detailed compre-
hensive analysis that covers a broad range of important aspects. Moreover,
having one coherent framework makes the output and welfare effects of con-
solidation via different instruments with and without ZLB constraint directly
comparable. Further, even though we study all fiscal instruments separately
to clearly distinguish their respective short- and long-run effects on output
and welfare, we conclude from our results that it is optimal to consolidate via
instruments with relatively low short-run output costs—such as government
consumption, transfers and the consumption tax rate—and use the therewith
obtained long-run fiscal space for increases in government investment and
labor and capital tax cuts, which provide the largest long-run benefits. Addi-
tionally, our analysis allows to account for the welfare and the distributional
consequences when setting up a specific fiscal consolidation policy mix.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 provides
a description of the model. Section 2.3 derives the long-run effects of fiscal
consolidation. Section 2.4 studies the short-run transmission. In section 2.5
we analyze how the results change when the ZLB on nominal interest rates
is binding. Section 2.6 presents the welfare analysis. Finally, section 2.7 con-
cludes.
2.2 A New Keynesian model with a fiscal sector
In this section we provide an overview about the main model features. The
model is a closed economy medium-scale DGE model. In addition to stan-
dard features like nominal frictions and real rigidities the model includes a
detailed fiscal sector and credit-constrained households. The introduction
of credit-constrained households leads to non-Ricardian effects of fiscal pol-
icy. Overall, the model consists of two household types, intermediate goods
producers, a representative final good producer, a central bank and a fiscal
authority. The decision problems of these agents are described in the follow-
ing.
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2.2.1 Households
There is a continuum of households indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]. A share of 1− ζ of
these households indexed by o ∈ [0, 1− ζ] are optimizing households. They
make forward looking decisions and have access to financial markets. The
lifetime utility function of each of these optimizing households o is given by:
Et
∞
∑
s=0
βs
(
ln(C˜o,t+s − hC˜
∗
o,t+s−1 − ψt)− χ
N
1+η
o,t+s
1 + η
)
, (2.1)
where ψt is a deterministic consumption demand shock which will be later
used to simulate a recession and a binding ZLB on interest rates. It is as-
sumed to follow an AR(1) process: ψt = ρψψt−1 + ǫ
ψ
t . The parameter h de-
termines the degree of external habit formation with respect to the aggregate
peer group consumption bundle C˜∗o,t+s−1.
3 The weight parameter χ is used
to pin down the steady state level of labor supply No,t+s.
As in Coenen et al. (2013) we include the possibility that government con-
sumption provides utility to households. Therefore, C˜o,t+s is a household
specific consumption bundle consisting of consumption of private goods Co,t
and government consumption CG,t:
C˜o,t =
(
κ
1
ν
c C
ν−1
ν
o,t + (1− κc)
1
νC
ν−1
ν
G,t
) ν
ν−1
. (2.2)
κc denotes the share of government consumption in the consumption bundle
and ν > 0 measures the degree of substitution between private and public
consumption.
Optimizing households face the following period t budget constraint:
(1 + τct )Co,t + Io,t +
Bo,t
Pt
= (1− τnt )
Wo,t
Pt
No,t +
[
(1− τkt )r
k
t ut + τ
k
t δ(ut)
]
Ko,t−1
+ Rt−1
Bo,t−1
Pt
+ TRo,t + Divo,t. (2.3)
They decide on the holdings of nominal government bonds Bo,t, the accu-
mulation of physical capital Ko,t, and the amount of consumption Co,t and
investment Io,t. Furthermore, optimizing households choose the degree of
3Marginal utility of income is identical across optimizing households, because house-
hold members pool their wage income. Therefore, C˜o,t+s = C˜∗o,t+s holds in equilibrium.
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capital utilization ut. Optimizing households receive wage income Wo,tNo,t,
dividend payments from the firms Divo,t and lump-sum transfers from the
government TRo,t. They need to pay taxes on consumption τ
c
t , labor income
τnt and capital income τ
k
t . Capital income taxes are levied on capital income
net-of-depreciation as in Prescott (2002, 2004) and Trabandt and Uhlig (2011).
The effective amount of capital services which is rent out to firms is:
Ke f f ,o,t = utKo,t−1. (2.4)
The capital accumulation equation is given by:
Ko,t = (1− δ(ut))Ko,t−1 + ιt
[
1− St
(
Io,t
Io,t−1
)]
Io,t, (2.5)
where ιt is a deterministic investment technology shock which will later be
used in combination with the preference shock to simulate a recession. It is
assumed to follow the AR(1)process: ιtι = (
ιt−1
ι )
ρι exp(ǫιt). Following Chris-
tiano et al. (2005), we assume that it is costly to adjust gross investment. The
investment adjustment cost function takes the form:
St
(
Io,t
Io,t−1
)
=
κ
2
[
Io,t
Io,t−1
− 1
]2
. (2.6)
Capital depreciates with a rate δ(ut). The depreciation rate is time varying
and depends on deviations of the capital utilization rate from its steady state
level u = 1. The specific functional form is quadratic and similar to Leeper
et al. (2010):
δ(ut) = δ0 + δ1(ut − 1) +
δ2
2
(ut − 1)
2. (2.7)
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Maximizing the utility function with respect to Co,t, Bo,t, Ko,t, Io,t and ut
subject to the above constraints leads to the following first order conditions:
λo,t =κ
1
ν
c
(
C˜o,t
Co,t
) 1
ν (C˜o,t − hC˜∗o,t−1 − ψt)
−1
(1 + τct )
, (2.8)
λo,t =βEtλo,t+1
Rt
Πt+1
, (2.9)
Qt =βEt
λo,t+1
λo,t
[
(1− τkt+1)ut+1r
k
t+1 + τ
k
t+1δ(ut+1)
+ Qt+1(1− δ(ut+1))
]
, (2.10)
1 =Qt ιt
[
1− St
(
Io,t
Io,t−1
)
−
∂St
∂Io,t
Io,t
]
− βEt
λo,t+1
λo,t
Qt+1 ιt+1
∂St+1
∂Io,t
Io,t+1, (2.11)
Qtδ
′(ut) =(1− τ
k
t )r
k
t + τ
k
t δ
′(ut), (2.12)
where λo,t is the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint, Qt is Tobins’s
Q and Πt+1 is the gross inflation rate.
A share ζ of the households indexed by r ∈ [1− ζ, 1] are credit-constrained
households, which do not have access to financial markets so that the budget
constraint involves less terms than for optimizing households:
(1 + τct )Cr,t = (1− τ
n
t )
Wr,t
Pt
Nr,t + TRr,t. (2.13)
Credit-constrained households have the same utility function as optimizing
households. In each period they, however, fully consume their current labor
income and the transfers received from the government because they can-
not smooth consumption as they do not have access to the bond market and
cannot invest in physical capital.
2.2.2 Wage setting
As in Erceg et al. (2000), we assume that each household is a monopolistic
supplier of differentiated labor services Ni,t. The household sells this labor
service to a representative firm that bundles all labor services into an aggre-
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gate labor service Nt via:
Nt =
(∫ 1
0
N
θw−1
θw
i,t di
) θw
θw−1
. (2.14)
The demand for Ni,t is given by:
Ni,t =
(
Wi,t
Wt
)−θw
Nt, (2.15)
where Wt is the aggregate wage index, which is defined as:
Wt =
(∫ 1
0
W1−θwi,t di
) 1
1−θw
. (2.16)
Optimizing households set nominal wages in staggered contracts. Every
period, there is a probability of 1 − ωw that each household member is al-
lowed to re-optimize the wage. If a household member is not allowed to set
the wage optimally it is simply indexed to inflation in period t− 1:
Wo,t = Wo,t−1
(
Pt−1
Pt−2
)γw
, (2.17)
where γw is the parameter defining the degree of indexation.
When an optimizing household is allowed to reset the wage Wo,t is chosen
to maximize the intertemporal utility function (2.1) subject to the intertem-
poral budget constraint (2.3) and the labor demand equation (2.15). The re-
sulting first order condition is:
Et
∞
∑
k=0
(βωw)
k
[
(1− τnt+k)
W∗o,t
Pt+k
(
Pt+k−1
Pt−1
)γw
−
θw
θw − 1
(1 + τct+k)MRSo,t+k
]
× λo,t+kNo,t+k = 0, (2.18)
where W∗o,t denotes the optimal wage set in period t and MRSo,t+k ≡
−
∂Uo,t+k/∂No,t+k
∂Uo,t+k/∂Co,t+k
denotes the marginal rate of substitution between consump-
tion and hours worked.
As in Erceg and Lindé (2013) we assume that credit-constrained house-
holds set their wage equal to the average wage rate of the optimizing house-
holds. Because both household types face the same labor demand sched-
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ule this assumption implies that the demand for labor is equally distributed
between household types, No,t = Nr,t = Nt. For a discussion of alterna-
tive wage-setting schemes for credit-constrained households the reader is re-
ferred to Furlanetto (2011).
The definition of the aggregate wage index in equation (2.16) implies, that
the law of motion for the wage index is given by:
W1−θwt = (1−ωw)(W
∗
t )
1−θw + ωw
((
Pt−1
Pt−2
)γw
Wt−1
)1−θw
. (2.19)
2.2.3 Firms
The production side of the economy consist of an intermediate goods sector
and a final good sector.
Final good sector
In the final good sector, a representative retail firm bundles intermediate
products yj,t into a composite final good Yt using a CES aggregator:
Yt =
(∫ 1
0
y
θp−1
θp
j,t dj
) θp
θp−1
. (2.20)
Given the price pj,t of the intermediate inputs, the retail firm chooses inter-
mediate good inputs yj,t to minimize the costs of producing Yt. This cost
minimization problem yields the demand function for each variety of the in-
termediate input:
yj,t =
(
pj,t
Pt
)−θp
Yt. (2.21)
Perfect competition in the final good market implies that the retail firm sells
each unit of output at price Pt:
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
p
1−θp
j,t dj
) 1
1−θp
. (2.22)
Intermediate goods sector
There is a continuum of differentiated intermediate goods producers, in-
dexed by j ∈ [0, 1]. Each firm j produces output with a Cobb-Douglas pro-
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duction function,
yj,t = ztK
κk
G,t−1K
α
e f f ,j,tN
1−α
j,t − Φ, (2.23)
where Ke f f ,j,t and Nj,t, denote effective capital and labor employed by the
firm. The parameter α defines the elasticity of output with respect to private
capital. Following Baxter and King (1993), KG,t−1 is the public capital stock
available in period t, and κk is the elasticity of output with respect to public
capital. Φ are fixed costs of production. Finally, zt is aggregate total factor
productivity.
Intermediate goods firms buy factor inputs in perfectly competitive mar-
kets. Let wt and r
k
t denote the real wage rate and the rental rate of capital.
Cost minimization implies that real marginal costs are given by
mct =
1
zt K
κk
G,t−1
(rkt )
αw1−αt
1
(1− α)1−ααα
, (2.24)
which are identical across firms.
Intermediate goods firms sell their products under monopolistic competi-
tion. In every period each firm faces the constant probability 1−ωp of being
allowed to re-optimize its price pj,t. If a firm is not allowed to set its price
optimal in period t we assume that a firm indexes its price to last period’s
inflation pj,t =
(
Pt−1
Pt−2
)γp
pj,t−1, with the parameter γp defining the degree of
indexation. If a firm is allowed to set the optimal price in period t it maxi-
mizes
Et
∞
∑
k=0
(ωpβ)
kλo,t+k
λo,t
[
pj,t
Pt+k
(
Pt+k−1
Pt−1
)γp
−mct+k
]
yj,t+k (2.25)
taking the demand for its products as given. The resulting first order condi-
tion is
Et
∞
∑
k=0
(ωpβ)
k λo,t+k
λo,t
[
p∗t,j
Pt+k
(
Pt+k−1
Pt−1
)γp
−
θp
θp − 1
mct+k
]
yj,t+k = 0, (2.26)
where p∗t,j is the optimal price set in period t.
The definition of the aggregate price index in equation (2.22) implies, that
the law of motion for the price index is given by:
P
1−θp
t = (1−ωp)(p
∗
t,j)
1−θp + ωp
((
Pt−1
Pt−2
)γp
Pt−1
)1−θp
. (2.27)
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2.2.4 Monetary policy
We assume that the central bank follows a Taylor type rule to set the nominal
interest rate Rt:
Rt
R
=
(
Rt−1
R
)ρR (Πt
Π
)δπ ( Yt
Yf ,t
)δy
(1−ρR)
, (2.28)
where Yf ,t is the flex-price output level. The parameter ρR determines the de-
gree of interest rate smoothing, whereas the parameters δπ and δy determine
the response to the deviations of inflation from its steady state value and the
output gap.
2.2.5 Fiscal policy
The government budget constraint in real terms is:
bt + τ
n
t wtNt + τ
c
t Ct +
[
utr
k
t − δ(ut)
]
τkt Kt−1 = CG,t + IG,t + TRt +
Rt−1
Πt
bt−1.
(2.29)
bt =
Bt
Pt
denotes the end of period t stock of government debt. Govern-
ment spending consists of public consumption CG,t, public investment IG,t
and transfers TRt to households. On the revenue side the government raises
taxes on private consumption τct as well as on labor income τ
n
t and capital
income τkt .
The public capital stock evolves as
KG,t = (1− δG)KG,t−1 +
[
1− SG,t
(
IG,t
IG,t−1
)]
IG,t, (2.30)
where δG is the depreciation rate and SG,t (IG,t/IG,t−1) is an adjustment cost
function, which has the same functional form as the adjustment cost function
for the accumulation of physical private capital.
The fiscal instruments adjust endogenously according to a fiscal rule to
ensure convergence to the steady state. For the expenditure instruments we
define the linear rule (2.31) and for the revenue instruments we define the
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linear rule (2.32):
xt − xt−1 = − φ0
(
bYt−1 − bYtarget
)
− φ1 (bYt−1 − bYt−2) , (2.31)
sx
(
τxt − τ
x
t−1
)
= φ0
(
bYt−1 − bYtarget
)
+ φ1 (bYt−1 − bYt−2) . (2.32)
xt =
Xt
Y denotes the share of the expenditure instrument relative to initial
steady state output, where Xt = {CG,t, IG,t, TRt}. sx =
Sx
Y denotes the ini-
tial steady state tax base of the revenue instrument relative to GDP, where
Sx = {C,wN, (rk− δ0)K} and τ
x
t = {τ
c
t , τ
n
t , τ
k
t }. The expenditure and the rev-
enue instruments react to the deviation of the debt-to-GDP ratio bYt−1 =
bt
4Yt
from its long-run target bYtarget and the change in the debt-to-GDP ratio. If
the debt-to-GDP ratio is above its target, this leads to a reduction of gov-
ernment expenditures (see equation (2.31)) or to an increase in tax rates (see
equation (2.32)). The parameter φ0 determines how large these adjustments
are. The reaction to the change in the debt-to-GDP ratio ensures that fiscal
instruments are adjusted smoothly. The smoothness is controlled by the pa-
rameter φ1.
2.2.6 Calibration
In calibrating the model we mainly rely on estimates from Drautzburg and
Uhlig (2011). They estimate a closed economy DSGE model similar to ours
using US data from 1947 to 2009 with Bayesian techniques. We use estimates
for the US as our simulation exercise mirrors the US case more closely than
for example consolidation efforts of countries in the euro area. Some of these
countries have experienced high increases in risk premia which might de-
crease along with fiscal consolidation. This might have additional positive
effects on GDP which are not captured by our model. While the US debt-to-
GDP ratio is increasing and thus fiscal consolidation is an important topic,
risk premia have not risen substantially yet, so that our model framework is
appropriate.
Initial steady state tax rates are taken from Trabandt and Uhlig (2011). They
use the methodology from Mendoza et al. (1994) to calculate average effective
tax rates. Based on data from 1995 to 2007 the consumption tax rate is set to 5
percent, the labor tax rate to 28 percent and the capital tax rate to 36 percent.
The calibration of the tax rates is important for the results with respect to
Laffer curve effects. Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) show that for the US these
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tax rates are on the left hand side of the labor and capital tax Laffer curves in
a neoclassical growth model with steady state characteristics roughly similar
to the our model. An increase in these tax rates will therefore increase tax
revenues. For the consumption tax rate they do not find a peak of the Laffer
curve so that consumption tax rate hikes will lead to rising tax revenues, too.
The slope of the Laffer curve does not change much for a range of about 20
to 40 percent for the labor tax rate and about 0 percent to 50 percent for the
capital tax rate so that the results should also give some indication for the
effects of fiscal consolidation for somewhat different initial steady state tax
rates.
Drautzburg and Uhlig (2011) obtained time averages of government spend-
ing components from NIPA table 3.1. Accordingly, we calibrate spending
on government consumption to 15.22 percent (this includes the value for
net exports) and spending on government investment to 4 percent of GDP.
The initial steady state transfer-to-GDP ratio is implied by the government
budget constraint in equation (2.29) and amounts to 6.95 percent of GDP
which is close to the actual value of 8.47 percent in the sample used by
Drautzburg and Uhlig (2011). The share of credit-constrained households
is set to ζ = 0.25. Overall transfers are split up between household types
according to their share in the population. In consequence, consumption lev-
els differ in steady state. In our setup the consumption of credit-constrained
households amount to 87 percent of the consumption of optimizing house-
holds.
The parameters of the fiscal policy rule are set to φ0 = 0.0125 and φ1 = 0.25.
These parameter values lead to a smooth transition of the stabilizing instru-
ment and the debt-to-GDP ratio to the long-run equilibrium. The efficiency
of public capital is set to κk = 0.05 as in Baxter and King (1993). The depre-
ciation rate of public capital is equal to the steady state depreciation rate of
private capital (δ0 = δG = 0.0145) as in Drautzburg and Uhlig (2011).
The inverse of the labor supply elasticity equals 2.16 which is consistent
with microeconomic estimates (Chetty et al. (2011)) and the intratemporal
elasticity of substitution is set to one so that we have a log utility specifi-
cation. We set the discount factor β = 0.995, which implies an annualized
steady state nominal interest rate of 2 percent. We choose this rather low
nominal interest rate in order to push the economy more easily to the zero
lower bound on nominal interest rates. Steady state gross inflation is Π = 1
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so that there is no price dispersion in steady state. There are adjustment costs
for private capital, κ = 4.51, and for public capital, κG = 7.11, as estimated
by Drautzburg and Uhlig (2011). We set the parameter δ1 equal to the steady
state rental rate of capital to ensure that capacity utilization equals unity in
steady state. The value δ2 = 0.29 is an estimate taken from Leeper et al.
(2010). An overview about all parameters can be found table 2.1.
2.2.7 Consolidation scenario
We start all simulations from an initial steady state debt-to-GDP ratio of 70
percent which is about the average US debt-to-GDP ratio from 1995 to 2013.
We adjust the fiscal instruments in a way that the debt-to-GDP ratio is re-
duced to 60 percent which is the average debt-to-GDP ratio from 1995 to
2007.
We run six consolidation scenarios, one for each of the six fiscal instru-
ments. In each scenario we hold five instruments constant, i.e. we shut-off
the fiscal rules (2.31) and (2.32) for these five instruments. For the remain-
ing instrument we use the respective fiscal rule in equation (2.31) or (2.32).
To achieve the desired debt reduction, we set the target debt-to-GDP ratio in
this fiscal rule equal to 60 percent. The fiscal rule ensures that the fiscal in-
strument is adjusted in a way that the debt-to-GDP ratio smoothly decreases
towards the target.
The first term on the right hand side of the fiscal rules ensures that the
difference between the initial debt-to-GDP ratio and the target ratio leads
to a reduction in government spending (equation 2.31) or an increase in tax
rates (equation 2.32). The second term on the right hand side of the fiscal
rules ensures that the consolidation is smoothed out over time by penalizing
large period to period changes in the debt-to-GDP ratio. Once the debt-to-
GDP ratio is close to the target the fiscal rules reverse the adjustment of fiscal
instruments. Otherwise a permanent reduction in government spending or a
permanent increase in tax revenues would lead to a permanent surplus and
a continuing decrease of the debt-to-GDP ratio. In the final steady state the
level of government spending even increases slightly above the initial steady
state level because there is additional fiscal space caused by the lower level
of government debt which leads to lower interest rate payments compared to
the initial steady state. Similarly, in the case of a tax based consolidation, in
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Table 2.1: Calibrated parameters
Parameter Value
Discount factor β 0.995
Intratemporal elasticity of substitution σ 1
Weight of private consumption in the utility function κc 1
Inverse of Frisch labour elasticity η 2.16
Degree of habit formation h 0.80
Share of credit-constrained households ζ 0.25
Steady state labor N 0.30
Investment adjustment cost private capital κ 4.51
Private capital depreciation:
δ0 0.0145
δ1 r
k
δ2 0.29
Investment adjustment cost public capital κG 7.11
Public capital depreciation rate δG 0.0145
Efficiency of public capital in private production κk 0.05
Capital share α 0.24
Price mark-up parameter θp 2.06
Wage mark-up parameter θw 3.00
Government consumption share CG/Y 0.1522
Government investment share IG/Y 0.04
Transfer share TR/Y 0.0695
Consumption tax rate τc 0.05
Labor tax rate τn 0.28
Capital tax rate τk 0.36
debt-to-GDP ratio bY 0.70
Responsiveness of instruments to deviations from debt target φ0 0.0125
Responsiveness of expenditure instruments to debt changes φ1 0.25
Steady state gross inflation Π 1
Calvo price ωp 0.81
Calvo wage ωw 0.83
Price indexation γp 0.28
Wage indexation γw 0.41
Taylor rule inflation reaction δπ 1.63
Taylor rule output gap reaction δy 0.13
Taylor rule interest rate smoothing ρR 0.92
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the new steady state the tax rate is reduced slightly below the initial steady
state level.
We first solve for the initial steady state and then for the final steady state
with the reduced debt-to-GDP ratio. Afterwards, we compute transitional
dynamics between the initial and the final steady state. Here we use deter-
ministic simulations and solve for transitional dynamics by using the stacked
Fair-Taylor algorithm. This procedure has the advantage that we can work
with the non-linear model. Households, firms and policy makers have per-
fect foresight and the paths of fiscal instruments and debt dynamics are fully
anticipated. From the first simulation period onwards optimizing house-
holds and firms adjust their decisions accordingly. For the baseline simu-
lations all dynamics are solely caused by the deviation of the initial debt-to-
GDP ratio from its target and the adjustments of the considered fiscal instru-
ment via the fiscal rule. For the analysis of fiscal consolidation at the ZLB
we include additional recessionary shocks. That specific setting is discussed
in detail in section 2.5. For the baseline simulations we further assume that
government consumption does not provide utility to households. Hence, we
set κc = 1 in equation (2.2). The case of κc < 1 will also be analyzed.
2.3 Long-run effects of fiscal consolidation
While the main focus of this paper certainly lies on the short- to medium-
run transmission of fiscal consolidation, here we shortly discuss the long-run
effects. In the long run, the economy converges to the new steady state with a
reduced debt-to-GDP ratio. This implies lower interest rate payments for the
government which, depending on the simulated fiscal instrument, lead either
to a small increase in government expenditures or a small decrease in tax
rates compared to the initial steady state. These steady state changes in fiscal
instruments have effects on the steady state values of other macroeconomic
variables.
2.3.1 Key steady state equations
Short-run nominal frictions and whether or not the transition to the new
steady state includes a period of a binding ZLB on the nominal interest rate
do not matter for the steady state. To understand the long-run effects it is
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therefore sufficient to focus on the key steady state relations. These are very
similar to the steady state of a simple real business cycle (RBC) model except
that our model includes monopolistic rather than perfect competition and a
variety of fiscal instruments.
Households set wages in the monopolistic labor market as a mark-up over
the marginal rate of substitution (MRS). The consumption tax and labor tax
rate drive a further wedge between the real wage and the MRS:
1− τn
1 + τc
w =
θw
θw − 1
MRS. (2.33)
The optimality condition for capital shows that the steady state rental rate
of capital depends only on the capital tax rate, the discount factor and the
steady state depreciation rate of capital:
rk =
1
β + τ
kδ0 − 1 + δ0
1− τk
. (2.34)
Finally, after aggregating over all intermediate goods firms it follows that
factor prices equal their respective marginal products adjusted by the inverse
price mark-up:
w =
θp − 1
θp
MPL, with MPL = (1− α)zK
κk
G
(
K
N
)α
, (2.35)
rk =
θp − 1
θp
MPK, with MPK = αzK
κk
G
(
K
N
)α−1
. (2.36)
2.3.2 Long-run transmission of different fiscal consolidation
strategies
Table 2.2 shows the long-run effects of fiscal consolidation for the different
instruments. Column 1 shows in each row which instrument is adjusted and
the other columns show the effects on key macroeconomic variables. The
long-run use of additional fiscal space due to lower interest rate payments is
shown in the last column. The numbers in the table show percentage changes
relative to the initial steady state except for the debt-to-GDP ratio and the tax
rates where percentage point changes are reported.
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Table 2.2: Long-run effects of fiscal consolidation for various consolidation
instruments
Y C C˜ I N w rk Co Cr ∆Instr.
CG (κc = 1) 0.12 -0.18 -0.18 0.12 0.12 0.00 0.00 -0.27 0.11 0.22
CG (κc = 0.75, ν = 1.5) 0.08 -0.22 0.15 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.00 -0.31 0.07 0.21
CG (κc = 0.75, ν = 0.5) 0.33 0.00 0.58 0.33 0.33 0.00 0.00 -0.09 0.29 0.28
IG 0.76 0.38 0.38 0.76 0.14 0.61 0.00 0.30 0.67 0.39
TR 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.06 0.36 0.21
τc 0.12 0.16 0.16 0.12 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.45 -0.36
τn 0.16 0.20 0.20 0.16 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.53 -0.32
τk 0.62 0.39 0.39 2.31 0.08 0.53 -1.66 0.35 0.55 -3.17
Notes: τc, τn and τk denote consumption, labor and capital tax rates. ν = 1.5 denotes
the case where public and private consumption are substitutes and ν = 0.5 denotes the
case where they are complements. All variables are denoted in percentage changes except
for ∆By which is in percentage points. ∆ Instrument is expressed as percentage change
relative to initial GDP for expenditure instruments and percentage point changes for tax
instruments. The steady state percentage change in the capital stock K is the same as in
investment I.
Government consumption
Government consumption does not show up in the above mentioned steady
state relations, but in the resource constraint. In the baseline scenario (row 1,
κc = 1) a permanent increase in government consumption absorbs resources
from the economy, without providing utility to households. This induces a
negative wealth effect on households, leading to a crowding-out of aggre-
gate consumption and higher labor supply. The latter leads to an increase
in the marginal product of capital (MPK), as shown in equation (2.36). The
rental rate of capital is pinned down by equation (2.34) and therefore can-
not adjust upwards in response to the increase in MPK. In consequence, the
response of optimizing households is an increase in the steady state capital
stock and investment to bring down the MPK to its initial level. Thus, the
capital-labor-ratio does not differ from the initial steady state implying no
real wage changes (equation 2.35). Higher labor and capital inputs lead to
an increase in output. The two household types are affected very differently.
The crowding-out of aggregate consumption is solely caused by optimizing
households. The reason is that the lower debt-to-GDP ratio leads to lower
interest income from holding government bonds so that consumption is re-
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duced. On the contrary, the labor income of credit-constrained households
rises which leads to higher consumption.
Arguably, at least some subcomponents of government consumption like
expenditures on education, health care or defense might provide utility to
households. Therefore, we analyse now how the results change, if we set the
share parameter κc in equation (2.2) to 0.75, which is in line with the existing
literature (see e.g. Bouakez and Rebei (2007) or Coenen et al. (2012)). The pa-
rameter ν measures the degree of substitutability between private and public
consumption. In the existing literature there is no clear consensus whether
private and public consumption are substitutes or complements. Prescott
(2002) argues that they are substitutes, whereas more recent estimates ob-
tained from structural DSGE models suggest that they are complements (see
e.g. Bouakez and Rebei, 2007, for the US or Coenen et al., 2012, for the euro
area). Therefore we consider ν = 1.5 and ν = 0.5. The former implies that
private and public consumption are substitutes, while the latter implies that
they are complements.
For ν = 1.5 output increases by only 0.08 percent compared to 0.12 per-
cent in the baseline scenario. In case of ν = 0.5 output is boosted by 0.33
percent. The reason for these differences lies in the different steady state val-
ues of consumption. In the baseline case private consumption is crowded
out by government consumption. This effect is amplified if private and pub-
lic consumption are substitutes because private consumption can be reduced
without a loss in utility. By contrast, in the case where they are complements
a decrease in private consumption in response to an increase in government
consumption is prevented. On the one hand an increase in government con-
sumption takes away resources from the economy which puts negative pres-
sure on private consumption, but on the other hand households also want
to increase private consumption to complement the increase in public con-
sumption. Hence, the overall effect on private consumption is zero.
Government investment
A permanent increase in government investment has the same negative
wealth effect as government consumption (the baseline case in which gov-
ernment consumption does not provide utility to households). In addition,
there is a positive effect stemming from the long-run increase in the pub-
lic capital stock. Equations (2.35) and (2.36) show that the rise of KG works
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like a productivity shift. The strength of this productivity channel depends
on the productivity parameter of the public capital stock κK and the initial
steady state share of public investment. Again, the rental rate of capital is
fixed so that factor inputs need to adjust to bring down the MPK. That is,
investment must increase more than hours to raise the capital-labor ratio. A
higher capital-labor ratio leads to an increase in the marginal productivity of
labor (MPL) and the real wage. Altogether, this results in a strong increase in
long-run output and an increase in consumption for both household types.
Transfers
In contrast to government consumption and investment an increase in trans-
fers has no direct effect on GDP as transfers are not a demand component
of output. They have, however, effects on private consumption and invest-
ment and impact GDP through these indirectly. Transfers increase by the
additional fiscal leeway created through lower interest payments. The long-
run increase in transfers is lower compared to the other expenditure instru-
ments. Transfers do not show up in the above steady state equations and
therefore do not alter any equilibrium prices or ratios. If there were no credit-
constrained households, Ricardian equivalence would hold and there would
be no change in output or consumption at all. The increase in transfers paid
to households would exactly offset the decrease in interest income from hold-
ing government bonds. Credit-constrained households do not suffer from
reduced interest rate income and use the increase in transfers for consump-
tion. Consequently, output increases slightly to satisfy additional demand.
The MRS is unaffected so that the wage set by households does not change.
Firms demand more labor to produce more output. The consumption of op-
timizing households falls slightly due to the reduction in their income from
holding government bonds. This reduction is not fully compensated through
the increase in transfers since a share of the additional transfers is given to
the credit-constrained households. The rental rate of capital stays constant
according to equation (2.34) so that capital adjusts upwards until the pre-
consolidation capital-labor ratio is restored.
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Consumption tax rate
A long-run decrease of the consumption tax rate makes consumption rela-
tive to leisure less expensive. This shifts the MRS upwards without affecting
the wage or the rental rate of capital as can be seen from equations (2.33)
and (2.34). Consumption increases because households can afford more con-
sumption goods for a given level of income. The additional demand leads to
an increase in output. The factor inputs increase proportionally as their ratio
remains unchanged to ensure that the real wage and the rental rate of capital
remain constant (equations (2.35) and (2.36)). The increase in hours worked
leads to an increase in wage income, which further amplifies the increase in
consumption. Overall, all variables except for private and public consump-
tion converge to nearly the same level as in the government consumption
based consolidation scenario.
Labor tax rate
A decrease in the labor tax rate leads to a higher after-tax income and in-
creases incentives to work. The opportunity costs of leisure relative to con-
sumption increase. Households want to consume more and enjoy less leisure
which changes the MRS without altering the pre-tax wage. The rental rate
of capital does not change as can be seen in equation (2.34). Therefore, the
capital intensity does not change. Labor, capital and therefore also output
increase by the same amounts and consumption goes up as households have
more wage income available.
Capital tax rate
A decrease in the capital tax rate lowers the rental rate of capital via equa-
tion (2.34). The usage of capital becomes cheaper. This reduction in capital
tax distortions leads to an increase of capital in production and raises the
capital-labor-ratio according to equation (2.36). In turn, the marginal prod-
uct of labor increases according to equation (2.35). In response the real wage
and the MRS adjust via equation (2.33). Output, consumption, investment
and hours worked increase. The increase of investment is much larger than
the increase of hours worked in order to equate the MPK to the new long-run
rental rate of capital. The increase in output is much higher than for the la-
bor and consumption tax rate scenarios. The capital tax base is small so that a
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large decrease in the capital tax rate is necessary to stabilize the debt-to-GDP
ration at the debt-neutral level. Hence, the capital stock and output increase
a lot.
2.3.3 Comparison of long-run output benefits
All considered fiscal consolidation strategies yield long-run output benefits.
The extent of these benefits, however, varies widely from an increase in out-
put of 0.03 percent to 0.76 percent. Government investment has the largest
effect on output, because it increases the productivity of both labor and cap-
ital. The second largest output expansions are achieved by capital and labor
tax cuts which both reduce tax distortions. The output effects of the capital
tax rate cut are, however, much higher than the ones of the labor tax rate cut.
A reduction in the consumption tax rate and an increase in government con-
sumption (baseline calibration) raise output via an increase in demand either
for private or public consumption. The effect on output triples if public con-
sumption is utility enhancing and complementary to private consumption. It
decreases somewhat in the substitution case. By contrast to all these scenar-
ios, an increase in transfers has almost no effect on output. In a model with-
out credit-constrained households the effect would be exactly zero, while in
our model output slightly increases via the increase in consumption of credit-
constrained households.
These differences, in long-run effects are also important for the short- to
medium-run transmission of fiscal policy because households and firms an-
ticipate these long-run developments and adjust their planning already in
the short run accordingly as will be shown in the next section.
2.4 Short-run transmission of fiscal consolidation
without zero lower bound constraint
In this section we analyse the short- to medium-run effects of fiscal consoli-
dation, i.e. the transitional dynamics between the initial and the final steady
state.
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2.4.1 Transmission of a government consumption based
consolidation
The transmission of a government consumption based consolidation is shown
in figure 2.1. We focus first on the solid lines, which show the baseline case in
which government consumption does not provide utility (κc = 1). The plot
for government consumption shows that it is reduced for about 20 quarters to
generate a government surplus and the debt-to-GDP ratio falls accordingly.
Afterwards, government consumption starts increasing, but stays below its
initial steady state for about another 30 quarters. Hence, the debt-to-GDP
ratio continues to fall until it finally converges to the debt-to-GDP target of
60 percent.
Government consumption is a component of aggregate demand. There-
fore, the reduction in government consumption has a direct negative effect
on output. The debt-to-GDP ratio stays more or less constant during the first
year despite the cuts in government expenditures because output decreases
and labor tax revenues fall due to the reduced tax base. The fiscal rule (2.31)
ensures that government consumption is reduced sufficiently, so that despite
this negative effect on output the debt-to-GDP ratio starts to fall after some
time.
The drop in output is smaller than the overall reduction in government
consumption because of an increase in private consumption. The immediate
expansion in consumption is solely due to the behavior of optimizing house-
holds who want to smooth their consumption path. They anticipate an in-
come increase because of the inflow of funds stemming from the repayment
of government debt holdings and accordingly they start to consume more.
Due to the consumption habit friction the increase in consumption takes a
while. In the long run, however, consumption of optimizing households is
below its initial steady state (see table 2.2). Nevertheless, consumption in-
creases temporarily because the transition to the final steady state takes so
long that it is largely discounted. The temporary wealth effect caused by the
repayment of debt does not only lead to an increase in consumption, but also
to a decrease in hours worked. This leads to a fall in labor income, which is
identical for optimizing and credit-constrained households and forces the lat-
ter to consume less. Their consumption is below the initial level for around
20 quarters. Optimizing households use debt repayments that they do not
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Figure 2.1: Transmission of consolidation via government consumption
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Notes: Solid line: baseline, dashed line: complements, dotted line: substitutes. Debt-to-GDP
ratio, inflation and the interest rate are denoted in percentage point changes. Consumption
and investment are weighted with their initial share of output. For the output gap level
values are plotted. Government consumption is weighted with the initial output share. All
other variables are plotted as percentage changes.
use for consumption to build up the capital stock in anticipation of the long-
run increase in output. Initially investment rises only slowly because of the
investment adjustment costs. As the increase in capital is not needed on the
production side in the beginning of the consolidation the capital utilization
rate falls.
On the production side of the economy firms react to the lack of demand
by reducing labor input. The amount of capital services is roughly held con-
stant during the first two years of consolidation. Labor input is reduced be-
cause optimizing households want to consume more and work less due to
the temporary wealth effect. They demand a higher wage but overall the
wage variation is small. The rental rate of capital decreases as the large re-
duction in hours worked reduces the marginal product of capital services.
The movements in the output gap are very small because the perfect fore-
sight assumption implies that firms which are able to adjust their prices in a
given period incorporate all future developments when setting the optimal
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price. Thus, inefficiencies due to price rigidities are small. Marginal costs
decrease as the decrease in the rental rate of capital is larger than the increase
in wages. This puts downward pressure on inflation and leads via the mon-
etary policy rule to a lower interest rate. The changes in inflation and the
interest rate are, however, very small.
Together with the increase in consumption the increase in investment coun-
terbalances the negative effects of government consumption on output so
that after about 20 quarters output starts to rise above the initial steady state
level. Accordingly, hours worked start to increase as well and the rise in la-
bor income leads to an increase in consumption of credit-constrained house-
holds. Finally, after 50 quarters government consumption increases above
the initial steady state. The full convergence to the final steady state takes
with about 60 years a long time.
Utility enhancing government consumption
Figure 2.1 also shows the cases in which government consumption provides
utility to households. Dashed lines denote the case of complementarity (κc =
0.75, ν = 0.5) and dotted lines the case of substitutability (κc = 0.75, ν = 1.5)
between private and public consumption.
The differences between the three specifications are to a large extent driven
by the responses of consumption. For the case where private and public con-
sumption are complements the wealth effect and the preference specification
work into opposite directions. In the beginning the wealth effect dominates
and triggers a rise in consumption of optimizing households. Once the drop
in public consumption becomes large enough optimizing households start
to reduce their consumption considerably.4 As a consequence aggregate de-
mand falls strongly. The drop in output at the recession trough is about twice
as large as in the baseline scenario. This large drop leads to a strong reduc-
tion in hours worked which ceteris paribus reduces the marginal product of
capital and therefore leads to a decline in the rental rate of capital. As a conse-
quence firms demand more capital services which leads to a strong increase
in investment.
For the case where private and public consumption are substitutes the ex-
pansion of private consumption is strongly amplified. The reason is that in
4Note, that households want to smooth C˜t and not Ct. Hence, while the path of private
consumption is wavelike, the path of C˜t (not shown) is very smooth.
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addition to the wealth effect the reduction of government consumption leads
optimizing households to increase their spending considerably. The wealth
effect and the preference specification work into the same direction. The
increase in private consumption almost completely offsets the reduction in
government consumption so that aggregate demand falls only slightly.
2.4.2 Transmission of a government investment based
consolidation
Figure 2.2 shows the short-run transmission of cuts in government invest-
ment (black lines). For comparison the grey lines show the effects of a gov-
ernment consumption (baseline calibration) based consolidation as discussed
above.
A consolidation via government investment would have exactly the same
effects as a cut in government consumption for the case of κk = 0. If κk >
0 the induced change in the public capital stock leads to differences. The
dashed line in the graph on the lower right shows the change in the public
capital stock. The public capital stock decreases slowly over time. Hence, on
impact the effect on private production via a reduction of the public capital
stock is small. Only over time the productivity of private capital and labor is
reduced substantially.
The initial negative effects are somewhat more pronounced compared to
a government consumption based consolidation because optimizing house-
holds anticipate the very persistent decline in output and income and are less
willing to increase consumption. By contrast, investment shows for the first
couple of years almost exactly the same path as for the case of a government
consumption reduction. This is because optimizing households invest in pri-
vate capital to temporary substitute for public investment. The rental rate of
capital and the real wage decrease. This is due to the lower factor produc-
tivity induced by the fall in the public capital stock. Households demand a
lower wage which reduces labor income for both household types and mutes
consumption, in particular for credit-constrained households. Inflation and
the interest rate fall as marginal costs decrease due to the decrease in the
rental rate of capital and the real wage.
After two years the highly negative consequences of the reduction in the
public capital stock emerge. Output remains persistently below its initial
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Figure 2.2: Transmission of consolidation via government investment
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Notes: See figure 2.1. For comparison grey lines show the simulation results from figure 2.1
(consolidation via government consumption). Government investment is weighted with the
initial output share. The dashed line in the bottom right picture denotes the change in the
public capital stock.
level because the public capital stock deteriorates. Meanwhile, the decline in
the debt-to-GDP ratio is very similar to the previous scenario. The fiscal rule
in equation (2.31) accounts for the larger decline in output and government
investment is reduced more than government consumption in the previous
scenario to ensure a decreasing debt-to-GDP ratio. This large reduction in
government investment amplifies the negative effects on output.
After about 5 years the decrease in government investment starts to re-
verse. After 10 more years government investment reaches the initial steady
state level and rises even further. The long-run increase in productivity of
hours and private capital are caused by the public capital stock and not di-
rectly by public investment. The dashed line in the graph on the lower right
shows that the public capital stock continues to decrease even though pub-
lic investment has already started to increase. The reason is that the level
of public investment is still below the initial steady state level and therefore
the depreciation of already installed public capital is larger than new pub-
lic investment. Hence, the substantial long-run benefits of a final increase in
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public investment are not visible during the first 50 quarters. In line with
this, output remains subdued for a long time. Roughly 30 years after the
start of the consolidation output exceeds its initial steady state level for the
first time.
2.4.3 Transmission of a transfer based consolidation
Figure 2.3 shows the impact of a transfer based consolidation strategy (black
lines). The grey lines show for comparison the effects of a government con-
sumption based consolidation. A transfer based consolidation strategy does
not lead to such a strong decline in output as the other two expenditure
based consolidations. The reason is that output is not directly affected by
the transfer cuts, but only indirectly via the impact on private consump-
tion and investment. The movements in output and most other variables
are very small and mainly caused by the drop in consumption of the credit-
constrained households. The transfer cut forces them to reduce consumption
immediately. This reduction is also much more pronounced than in the afore-
mentioned scenarios, where the reduction in consumption was solely due
to lower wage income. By contrast, consumption of optimizing households
barely moves at all. For them Ricardian equivalence applies. As the over-
all fall in production is much smaller than in the previous scenarios, hours
worked and the capital utilization rate fall less. In turn, the rental rate of
capital falls only little and wages increase only slightly. Further, the drop in
inflation and the interest rate is much lower than in the previous scenarios.
Thus, a consolidation via transfer payments has almost no effects on aggre-
gate variables. Credit-constrained households are, however, highly affected
and their consumption level drops considerably.
2.4.4 Transmission of a consumption tax based consolidation
Figure 2.4 shows the effects of a consumption tax based consolidation (black
lines) compared to a government consumption based consolidation grey lines.
The short-run output costs are smaller than for a government consumption
based consolidation. The main differences emerge with respect to consump-
tion because the consumption tax has a direct effect on the price of the con-
sumption good.
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Figure 2.3: Transmission of consolidation via government transfers
0 10 20 30 40 50
−10
−5
0
debt ratio
0 10 20 30 40 50
−1
0
1
transfers
0 10 20 30 40 50
−0.5
0
0.5
output
0 10 20 30 40 50
−0.5
0
0.5
consumption
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
0.5
1
investment
0 10 20 30 40 50
−0.5
0
0.5
hours
0 10 20 30 40 50
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
rental rate
0 10 20 30 40 50
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
real wage
0 10 20 30 40 50
−0.5
0
0.5
output gap
0 10 20 30 40 50
−0.2
−0.1
0
inflation, annualized
0 10 20 30 40 50
−0.2
−0.1
0
interest rate, annualized
0 10 20 30 40 50
−0.1
0
0.1
capital utilisation
0 10 20 30 40 50
−1
0
1
Co
0 10 20 30 40 50
−2
−1
0
1
Cr
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
1
2
capital services
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
1
2
physical capital
Notes: See figure 2.1. For comparison grey lines show the simulation results from figure 2.1
(consolidation via government consumption). Transfers are weighted with the initial output
share.
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Optimizing households anticipate the gradual increase in the consump-
tion tax rate and bring consumption forward to the first few quarters before
it becomes more expensive. This leads to a small increase in consumption of
optimizing households on impact. Thereafter, they start to reduce consump-
tion smoothly. If there would be no gradual increase in the consumption tax
rate then consumption would drop on impact. The reduction in consumption
is more rapid for credit-constrained households. Firms respond to the lack
in aggregate demand by employing less labor, which lowers income for all
households. The reduction in income forces credit-constrained households
to reduce consumption even further. While output falls less compared to the
government consumption based consolidation, the increase in consumption
tax revenues is muted by the declining consumption tax base. Thus, the path
of the debt-to-GDP is very similar to the government consumption based
consolidation.
Figure 2.4: Transmission of consolidation via consumption taxes
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Notes: See figure 2.1. For comparison grey lines show the simulation results from figure 2.1
(consolidation via government consumption). Consumption tax revenues are weighted with
their initial output share.
Optimizing households use the cash-flow from the debt repayment of the
government to invest in the physical capital stock in anticipation of the in-
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crease in long-run output. As the increase in the physical capital stock is
not used in production for some time, the capital utilization rate falls. The
amount of capital services is roughly held constant during the first two years
of consolidation. The tax hike increases the tax wedge between the marginal
rate of substitution between labor and consumption and the real wage. As a
consequence, optimizing households demand higher wages. The rental rate
of capital decreases since the reduction in hours worked reduces the marginal
product of capital services. Together, this implies a decrease in marginal
costs. However, compared to the government consumption based consoli-
dation the response is less volatile. Accordingly, the movements of inflation
and the interest rate are muted as well. The movements of the output gap are
again very small.
Output starts to increase once the increases in the consumption tax rate are
reversed. Optimizing households increase consumption because the tax rate
starts falling. However, this increase is relatively slow, because households
anticipate that the tax rate will be cut further. This makes consumption today
relatively more expensive compared to consumption tomorrow. Therefore
consumption is postponed to some extent. Credit-constrained households
cannot smooth consumption and increase their consumption directly once
the consumption tax rate starts to decrease.
2.4.5 Transmission of a labor tax based consolidation
Figure 2.5 shows the transmission of a labor tax based consolidation (black
lines). The contraction of output is much stronger and also much more per-
sistent than for the case of a consolidation via government consumption (grey
lines). The temporary tax increase does not only lead to a fall in after-tax in-
come, but also increases tax distortions on the labor market. Thus, incentives
to work are reduced. The reduction in output is very persistent, because
households postpone the final increase in hours worked until the reduction
of the labor tax rate is reversed and the tax rate starts to decrease.
Households’ labor income decreases because of the higher labor tax rate
and the reduction in hours worked. Hence, they reduce consumption. In ad-
dition, the negative output effects are aggravated by a negative investment
response. Optimizing households are able to smooth out the reduction in
consumption over time so that the short-run decline is rather small. Credit-
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Figure 2.5: Transmission of consolidation via labor taxes
0 10 20 30 40 50
−10
−5
0
debt ratio
0 10 20 30 40 50
−2
0
2
labor tax revenues
0 10 20 30 40 50
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
output
0 10 20 30 40 50
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
consumption
0 10 20 30 40 50
−0.5
0
0.5
1
investment
0 10 20 30 40 50
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
hours
0 10 20 30 40 50
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
rental rate
0 10 20 30 40 50
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
real wage
0 10 20 30 40 50
−0.5
0
0.5
output gap
0 10 20 30 40 50
−0.2
0
0.2
inflation, annualized
0 10 20 30 40 50
−0.2
0
0.2
interest rate, annualized
0 10 20 30 40 50
−0.1
0
0.1
capital utilisation
0 10 20 30 40 50
−1
0
1
Co
0 10 20 30 40 50
−4
−2
0
Cr
0 10 20 30 40 50
−1
0
1
2
capital services
0 10 20 30 40 50
−1
0
1
2
physical capital
Notes: See figure 2.1. For comparison grey lines show the simulation results from figure 2.1
(consolidation via government consumption). Labor tax revenues are weighted with their
initial output share.
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constrained households, however, need to adjust their consumption imme-
diately. As less output is produced, investment and capital utilization fall.
Effective capital used in production is reduced. The increase in labor taxes
triggers a temporary rise in the real wage because households want to be
partly compensated for the implied reduction in the after-tax real wage. The
drop in hours worked reduces the marginal productivity of capital, so that
the rental rate of capital falls. The overall effect on marginal costs is small so
that inflation and the interest rate barely move at all.
The negative effects on output are highly persistent, so that investment is
below its initial level for the first 50 quarters despite the anticipated increase
in output in the final steady state. Output starts to exceed its initial level
around 60 quarters after the beginning of the consolidation.
2.4.6 Transmission of a capital tax based consolidation
Figure 2.6 shows the effects of a capital tax based consolidation (black lines)
compared to a government consumption based consolidation (grey lines). A
capital tax based consolidation strategy has the strongest short-run impact on
economic activity of all consolidation scenarios considered. Output declines
by almost one percent during the first two years. The capital tax rate needs
to be increased considerably from 36 percent to a peak value of 52 percent
for the consolidation. The reason is that the initial tax base is relatively small
compared to the labor and consumption tax scenarios because capital depre-
ciation is exempted from taxation. The negative effects on GDP are very large
so that the debt-to-GDP ratio even increases slightly on impact. Only after
some quarters the debt-to-GDP ratio starts to fall as the deterioration of the
tax base slows down. The decrease in output is caused by the fall in invest-
ment. An even quicker decrease of investment is prevented by investment
adjustment costs.
Firms react to the decline in aggregate demand by reducing labor input
and lowering production. On the contrary, the amount of capital services
does not fall on impact. The reason is that we also observe a jump in the
capital utilization rate. This jump is due to agents’ anticipation of the change
in the steady state rental rate for capital, induced by the lower steady state
tax rate. As a consequence due to the reduction in hours, the rental rate on
capital drops slightly on impact. The drop of the rental rate is reversed after
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10 quarters, because of the strong reduction in the capital stock which ceteris
paribus increases the marginal product of capital.
In the beginning of the consolidation phase aggregate consumption ex-
pands. This is solely due to the behavior optimizing households. They in-
crease their consumption spending strongly because the increase in the cap-
ital tax rate lowers the value of installed physical capital. As a consequence,
it is optimal for them to reduce investment spending strongly and use these
funds instead for consumption. Wages fall somewhat due to the decrease in
the marginal rate of substitution between labor and consumption. The drop
in hours worked and wages leads credit-constrained households to reduce
consumption immediately.
Figure 2.6: Transmission of consolidation via capital taxes
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Notes: See figure 2.1. For comparison grey lines show the simulation results from figure 2.1
(consolidation via government consumption). Capital tax revenues are weighted with their
initial output share.
The output gap becomes negative. Inflation and the interest rate fall in the
short run more than in the other scenarios because of the joint decrease in the
rental rate of capital and wages that lead to a more pronounced decrease in
marginal costs than in the previous scenarios.
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Over time, the drop in the real wage and the rise in the rental rate lead
firms to shift to a more labor intensive production. In addition, output is
persistently below its initial level due to the strong reduction in the private
capital stock. The capital stock starts to increase after 30 quarters, but it takes
another 30 quarters until the initial steady state capital stock is reached again
and the expansion starts to accelerate. Therefore, convergence to the final
steady state is very slow.
2.4.7 Comparison of short-run transmission mechanisms
The above analysis shows that the transmission of fiscal policy and the size
of the short-run output costs depend crucially on whether production fac-
tors are directly affected. The costs are particularly high for a consolidation
via government investment or taxes on labor and capital. A cut in govern-
ment investment reduces productivity of labor and private capital. A labor
or capital tax rate hike increase tax distortions and lead to reductions in la-
bor and capital input in production. By contrast, a consumption tax hike
does not affect production inputs directly so that hours worked and output
fall less. A cut in government consumption reduces in the baseline calibra-
tion demand, production and in turn labor income and consumption without
increasing distortions or affecting productivity. If government consumption
provides utility then the effects depend on the substitutability of private and
public consumption. A reduction of transfers has almost no effect on output,
but only on the consumption of credit-constrained households. Their con-
sumption response turns out to be important for short-run dynamics in all
consolidation scenarios, while consumption of optimizing households is less
volatile as they smooth consumption.
The negative effects of fiscal consolidation are amplified because larger
adjustments of the specific fiscal instruments are necessary to achieve a re-
duction in the debt-to-GDP ratio despite the contraction of output. This can
lead to very persistent decreases in output if the private or public capital
stock decrease as it is the case for government investment and taxes on labor
and capital. The private and public capital stock continue to decrease even
when fiscal policy is being reversed as long as investment is below the initial
steady state and hence below the depreciation rate. Therefore, in these cases
the reduction in output is highly persistent, while for government consump-
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tion, transfers and the consumption tax rate output recovers much quicker.
Finally, for government consumption and investment based consolidations
the short-run output costs depend not only on the reactions of consumption
and investment through changes in the budget of households, but output
costs increase as the reduction in demand by the government reduces GDP
directly.
2.5 Fiscal consolidation at the zero lower bound
on interest rates
In this section we analyze the effects of fiscal consolidation when the cen-
tral bank is constrained by the ZLB on nominal interest rates. To do so, we
simulate a large recession and repeat the fiscal consolidation simulations in
this environment. This scenario should be helpful in understanding how the
effects of fiscal consolidation change in an environment that resembles the
post-crisis situation of low interest rates and weak demand that many coun-
tries face currently.
In the baseline case the drop in the interest rate was small. Nevertheless,
if the ZLB becomes binding conventional expansionary monetary policy be-
comes infeasible. In this case a prevention of lower nominal interest rates
leads to rising real interest rates if inflation drops. This reduces consumption
and output putting further downward pressure on inflation increasing the
real interest rate further. This makes larger adjustments in fiscal instruments
necessary to achieve a decrease in the debt-to-GDP ratio. These movements
can potentially be very strong so that the debt-to-GDP ratio might even in-
crease for some time rather than decrease.
2.5.1 Initial conditions for the zero lower bound
To create a recessionary environment which makes the ZLB actually binding
we assume that the economy is hit by two recessionary shocks. The first
shock is a negative consumption demand shock and the second shock is a
negative investment shock (see equations (2.1) and (2.5)). These shocks are
calibrated so that the simulated recession together with fiscal consolidation
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leads to a binding ZLB for five quarters. This is called the ’consolidation +
recessionary shocks’ scenario.5
In addition, we run a simulation in which the economy is hit by the reces-
sionary shocks only, but where no fiscal consolidation takes place. We call
this the ’recessionary shocks’ scenario. In this case, the government is sta-
bilizing the debt-to-GDP ratio at the initial level of 70 percent. In general,
during this simulation the duration of the ZLB becomes shorter and for two
fiscal instruments the ZLB does not bind because the negative fiscal impulse
is missing.
Finally, we subtract the trajectories of macroeconomic variables of the ’re-
cessionary shocks’ scenario from the ’consolidation + recessionary shocks’
scenario to isolate the effects of fiscal consolidation from those caused by the
recessionary shocks. Changes of the dynamics caused by the binding ZLB
are preserved. Hence, these simulation results of fiscal consolidation with a
binding ZLB can be compared directly to the results in the previous section
without any constraint on the nominal interest rate.
Our recession setup is similar to the one used in Christiano et al. (2011)
and Erceg and Lindé (2013) who also simulate a recession in order to achieve
a binding ZLB. Christiano et al. (2011) simulate a shock to the discount rate
and a financial friction shock, while Erceg and Lindé (2013) use the same
consumption demand shock as in our model in equation (2.1) and in addition
a labor augmented technology shock. In these models and in our model the
combination of two shocks yields a drop not only in consumption, but also
in investment.
As an example figure 2.7 shows the recessionary environment for the case
of consolidation via government consumption. The black lines show the ef-
fects of fiscal consolidation when the economy is simultaneously hit by the
recessionary shocks. The grey lines show the effects of the recessionary shocks
without fiscal consolidation.
5We calibrate the relative shock sizes to roughly mimic stylized business cycle facts for
the variability in output, consumption and investment. Consumption is about 3/4 as volatile
as output and investment is about 3 times more volatile than output.
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Figure 2.7: The recessionary environment
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Notes: Consolidation via government consumption. Black line: ’consolidation + recessionary
shocks’, grey line: ’recessionary shocks’.
In the ’consolidation + recessionary shocks’ scenario the interest rate hits
the ZLB for five quarters starting in the sixth quarter. We also observe a
pronounced decrease in inflation which implies a strong increase in the real
interest rate. Output declines strongly by around seven percent. This implies
a deterioration in public finances which is reflected by an increase in the debt-
to-GDP ratio by roughly eight percentage points.
For the other five consolidation scenarios we need larger recessionary
shocks to achieve a binding ZLB of five quarters. In consequence, the reces-
sionary environment differs across fiscal instruments in terms of the deep-
ness of the recession. Table 2.3 gives an overview of the relative size of the
recessionary shocks. The shocks for the consolidation via government con-
sumption as shown in figure 2.7 are normalized to unity. The largest shocks
occur in the case of a consolidation via labor taxes, which is almost twice as
large as for a government consumption based consolidation strategy.
Once we isolate the effects of fiscal consolidation from the effects of re-
cessionary shocks by calculating the difference of the ’consolidation + reces-
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sionary shocks’ and the ’recessionary shocks’ scenarios, the influence of the
difference in the shock sizes is neglectable.6
Table 2.3: Different shock sizes
CG IG TR τ
c τn τk
shock size 1 1.35 1.35 1.18 1.89 1.22
2.5.2 The effects of consolidation
Government consumption
Figure 2.8 shows the simulation results for a government consumption based
consolidation. The solid lines refer to the results of consolidation at the ZLB,
whereas the dashed lines refer to the results for the baseline simulations with-
out ZLB constraint. The drop in output is clearly amplified when the central
bank is constrained by the ZLB. It is about three times larger compared to
the simulation without ZLB constraint. The main reason for this is the pro-
nounced drop of inflation on impact which leads to a sharp rise of the real
interest rate compared to the baseline. In the beginning of the consolidation
the central bank tries to counteract the drop in inflation by reducing the in-
terest rate quickly, but in period six when the interest rate actually hits the
ZLB the central bank is not able to accommodate anymore.7,8
6In a linear model the differences in shock size would have no effect at all, once we net
out the effects of the recessionary shocks. Here, we work with the non-linear model, so that
a small effect of different shock sizes remains.
7The fact that the interest rate rises when the central bank is constrained by the ZLB
might look counterintuitive at first sight. The responses in figure 2.8 show, however, just the
difference between the two scenarios shown in figure 2.7. There, the interest rate decreases
faster in the ’consolidation + recessionary shocks’ than in the ’recessionary shocks’ scenario.
So, figure 2.8 shows the part of the interest rate decrease that is caused by the consolidation
and not the recession. In period six the interest rate hits the ZLB so that the difference
between the ’consolidation + recessionary shocks’ and the ’recessionary shocks’ scenario
shrinks which shows up as an increase in the interest rate in figure 2.8 once we subtract
the ’recessionary shocks’ scenario from the ’consolidation + recessionary shocks’ scenario.
After the ZLB does not bind anymore, the interest rate remains lower in the ’consolidation +
recessionary shocks’ scenario compared to the ’recessionary shocks’ so that figure 2.8 shows
a further expansion in monetary policy.
8In principle, a comparison between the ZLB and the no-ZLB scenario where the fiscal
consolidation starts when the ZLB binds and not before would also be possible. In this case
we would need, however, to construct a recessionary scenario that leads to a binding ZLB
without fiscal consolidation. If we do this, on the one hand the period of a binding ZLB
is different for different fiscal instruments so that the scenarios are not directly comparable
anymore and on the other hand the simulations become infeasible for some instruments as
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Another reason for the amplification in the decrease in output is the rein-
forcing mechanism between output and government consumption via the fis-
cal rule. A stronger decrease in output leads to a stronger decrease in govern-
ment consumption. This is necessary to achieve a falling debt-to-GDP ratio
despite the large decrease in output. In the first few quarters, the decrease in
government consumption even leads to a slight increase in the debt-to-GDP
ratio before it finally starts to fall. The larger drop in output mainly affects
credit-constrained households. They reduce consumption because of the re-
duction in wage income, while optimizing households smooth consumption
so that the differences to the baseline scenario without ZLB are small.
The ZLB binds until period eleven. Afterwards, because of the large drop
in output and inflation monetary policy is more expansionary than in the
baseline scenario without ZLB. This monetary-fiscal policy interaction results
in output converging back to the baseline within the next eight periods.
Figure 2.8: Transmission of consolidation via government consumption at
the ZLB
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Notes: solid line: effect of consolidation at ZLB, dashed line: baseline.
the period of a binding ZLB becomes so long that there is no feasible equilibrium path for
the economy.
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Government investment
Figure 2.9 shows the simulation results for the government investment based
consolidation scenario. The negative effect on output is even much more
Figure 2.9: Transmission of consolidation via government investment at the
ZLB
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Notes: solid line: effect of consolidation at ZLB, dashed line: baseline.
amplified than in the government consumption based consolidation. As be-
fore, the decline in output in the beginning is to a large extent driven by the
drop in inflation and the associated increase in the real interest rate. This
effect fades out quickly when the ZLB is not binding anymore and the real
interest rate returns to its baseline value. We observe, however, that output
stays persistently below the path from the baseline scenario even after the
real rate is back at the baseline. The persistently lower level of output is due
to a stronger reduction in government investment because of the increase in
the debt-to GDP ratio. This reduction in government investment has much
more persistent effects than reductions in government consumption because
the public capital stock shrinks. It takes longer to rebuild it, so that produc-
tivity of private production factors is persistently reduced even though the
ZLB does not bind anymore. The larger reduction in output leads to a larger
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reduction of the consumption of credit-constrained households, while opti-
mizing households are much less affected.
Transfers
Figure 2.10 shows the case of a transfer cut based consolidation scenario. As
with the two other expenditure instruments the amplification effect on out-
put through the ZLB is very strong. The drop in GDP is about three times
larger than in the baseline simulations. The overall magnitude of the reduc-
tion in output does not exceed 0.2 percent which is still low compared to the
other instruments. The debt-to-GDP ratio is hardly affected so that the reduc-
tion in transfers is very similar to the baseline scenario. Further, the ampli-
fication of the negative implications for consumption of credit-constrained
and optimizing households is small. In contrast to the government invest-
ment scenario the economy returns back to baseline relatively quickly when
the ZLB is not binding anymore.
Figure 2.10: Transmission of consolidation via transfers at the ZLB
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Consumption tax
Figure 2.11 shows the case of a fiscal consolidation via the consumption tax
rate. The drop in output is again amplified by the ZLB. The amplification
is, however, lower compared to the expenditure scenarios. There, the drop
in output was at least three times larger than in the scenario without ZLB,
while here, the drop in output only doubles. As in the transfer based con-
solidation at the ZLB, consumption of both household types is affected to a
similar extent. The transmission of the amplification works again through
the drop in inflation which raises the real interest rate above baseline for at
least ten quarters. The reduction in the debt-to-GDP ratio is delayed slightly
by the ZLB. Therefore, the government increases the tax rate more than in the
baseline case.
Figure 2.11: Transmission of consolidation via the consumption tax at the
ZLB
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Notes: solid line: effect of consolidation at ZLB, dashed line: baseline.
Labor tax
Figure 2.12 shows the effects of consolidation via the labor tax rate. A striking
feature of this consolidation scenario is that the drop in output is only little
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affected by the ZLB. At the trough of the output decline the output response
is amplified by a factor of only 1.1. This is very much in line with Erceg
and Lindé (2013), who find an amplification of the output response between
1.1 − 1.15 when the labor tax rate is used to consolidate. Their analysis is
based on a complex two country currency union model and they attribute the
favorable outcomes in the labor tax case to open economy channels. We show
that the small amplification of the output response also holds in a closed
economy setup. In our model the main driving force is the marginal cost
channel. As described in section 2.4 a consolidation via labor taxes leads in
the short run to an increase in the real wage. This effect is now amplified
at the ZLB as output decreases somewhat more which makes a somewhat
larger increase in the labor tax rate necessary. Hence, households demand a
higher wage compensation for the reduced after-tax wage. Figure 2.13 shows
that this leads to an earlier increase in marginal costs compared to baseline.
In turn, inflation expectations increase. Together, this prevents the inflation
rate to drop on impact and therefore lowers the real interest rate instead of
raising it.
Figure 2.12: Transmission of consolidation via the labor tax at the ZLB
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Notes: solid line: effect of consolidation at ZLB, dashed line: baseline.
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A lower real interest rate stimulates the economy and prevents output from
dropping significantly below baseline.9 Note, that in the analysis without
ZLB the drop in inflation is also the lowest of all six consolidation scenarios.
In addition, the drop in potential output is very strong so that only a small
decrease in the interest rate is sufficient to keep output close to potential.
Hence, the restriction on monetary policy caused by the ZLB is very small in
this case.
Figure 2.13: Marginal cost channel
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Notes: solid line: effect of consolidation at ZLB, dashed line: baseline. Variables are plotted as
percentage changes.
Capital tax Finally, figure 2.14 shows the simulation results for the capital
tax based consolidation. As in the other two tax based consolidation sce-
narios, the ZLB amplifies the negative output effects much less than in the
expenditure based consolidation scenarios. As in all other cases the ampli-
fication works through the increase in the real interest rate and the stronger
increase in the tax rate. At the ZLB the capital tax rate rises 19 percentage
points above the initial level, whereas in the baseline the tax rate rises only
16 percentage points above the initial level. The moderate amplification does,
however, not mean that a capital tax based consolidation is advisable. One
should keep in mind that without the ZLB constraint the short-run negative
effects are among the worst of all consolidation scenarios. They are even
worse without ZLB constraint than some consolidation scenarios via other
instruments with ZLB constraint. In addition this scenario has large dis-
9Eggertsson (2010) finds that a labor tax cut at the ZLB actually deepens a recession
because it puts downward pressure on inflation and leads to an increase in the real interest
rate. Our scenario is exactly the opposite as we simulate a labor tax hike. We also find that
this leads to an increase in inflation and a decrease in the real interest rate. However, in our
case this does not have a stimulative effect on output. Our model is quite different, which
might explain this difference. We study permanent rather than temporary policy changes,
our model includes government debt, we have credit-constrained households, sticky wages
and the labor tax rate adjusts endogenously to government debt.
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tributional consequences. The fall in the consumption of credit-constrained
households is much more amplified than the fall in the consumption of opti-
mizing households.
Figure 2.14: Transmission of consolidation via the capital tax at the ZLB
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Notes: solid line: effect of consolidation at ZLB, dashed line: baseline.
Summary
The analysis showed that a binding ZLB amplifies the negative output effects
by increasing the real interest rate. The effect is much stronger for expendi-
ture based consolidations than for revenue based consolidations. The labor
tax based consolidation is different from all other scenarios because the ZLB
actually amplifies the increase in the real wage, which leads to an increase
rather than a decrease in inflation. The real interest rate falls.
When deciding about the choice of the consolidation instrument not the
amplification at the ZLB is important, but the size of the overall effect on out-
put and other variables. Here, the results are similar to the analysis without
ZLB constraint. The costs of an increase in transfers are the lowest despite the
large amplification at the ZLB. The reason is that changes in transfers with-
out ZLB constraint were extremely small. The second least negative effect on
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output is caused by the consumption tax rate. Without binding ZLB changes
in government consumption had a similar effect on output as changes in the
consumption tax rate. This changes because the negative effects of govern-
ment consumption are amplified much more through the binding ZLB than
the ones of the consumption tax rate. These three instruments have in com-
mon that the negative effects on output are not very persistent. The other
three instruments (government investment, labor tax rate, capital tax rate)
lead with and without ZLB to a reduction of the private or public capital
stock and hence a persistent and deep output contraction.
2.6 Welfare effects of fiscal consolidation
While the policy debate and recent papers on fiscal stimulus and fiscal con-
solidation have focused on output developments, from an economic perspec-
tive welfare effects also matter. These can potentially be very different from
output effects. To which extent a policy that leads for example to an increase
in output also increases welfare depends on the paths of consumption and
leisure. If the output increase leads to a large increase in hours worked, but
only a modest increase in consumption, welfare might even decrease. In this
section we compute welfare effects and compare them to the output effects
of fiscal consolidation.
2.6.1 Calculating welfare measures
Welfare for optimizing households Vo,t and for credit-constrained households
Vr,t is given by their lifetime utility functions. Aggregate welfare Vt is the sum
of both weighted with their respective population shares:
Vo,t =
∞
∑
s=0
βs
(
ln(C˜o,t+s − hC˜o,t+s−1)− χ
N
1+η
o,t+s
1 + η
)
(2.37)
Vr,t =
∞
∑
s=0
βs
(
ln(C˜r,t+s − hC˜r,t+s−1)− χ
N
1+η
r,t+s
1 + η
)
(2.38)
Vt = (1− ζ)Vo,t + ζVr,t. (2.39)
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By evaluating equations (2.37) to (2.39) for different paths of C˜o,t, C˜r,t, No,t
and Nr,t, we can compute the welfare impact of different fiscal consolidation
strategies.
To compute the welfare impact of the whole fiscal consolidation path from
period one until the indefinite future we rewrite equations (2.37) and (2.38)
recursively:
Vo,t = ln(C˜o,t − hC˜o,t−1)− χ
N
1+η
o,t
1 + η
+ βVo,t+1 (2.40)
Vr,t = ln(C˜r,t − hC˜r,t−1)− χ
N
1+η
r,t
1 + η
+ βVr,t+1. (2.41)
Evaluating these expressions in t = 1 yields the welfare based on the paths
of consumption and hours worked for all periods t = 1, ..., ∞ for the two
household types owing to the perfect foresight assumption. We denote this
by Vo,1 and Vr,1, respectively. Aggregate welfare is thus given by V1 = (1 −
ζ)Vo,1 + ζVr,1.
As these measures are difficult to interpret, we express the welfare effects
in consumption equivalence units λo, λr and λ as in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(2006). Welfare effects expressed in consumption equivalence units can be in-
terpreted as the permanent change in consumption that would be necessary
to achieve the same change in welfare as through the impact of fiscal consol-
idation. These measures are implicitly given by:
Vo,1 =
1
1− β

ln((1 − h)(1 + λo)C˜o,i)− χN
1+η
o,i
1 + η

 (2.42)
Vr,1 =
1
1− β

ln((1 − h)(1 + λr)C˜r,i)− χN
1+η
r,i
1 + η

 (2.43)
λ = (1− ζ)λo + ζλr , (2.44)
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where C˜o,i, C˜r,i, No,i and Nr,i denote initial steady state values for consump-
tion and hours worked. The analytical solutions for λo, λr and λ are:
λo =
exp
(
(1− β)Vo,1 + χ
N
1+η
o,i
1+η
)
(1− h)Co,i
− 1 (2.45)
λr =
exp
(
(1− β)Vr,1 + χ
N
1+η
r,i
1+η
)
(1− h)Cr,i
− 1 (2.46)
λ = (1− ζ)λo + ζλr . (2.47)
The simulation results in sections 2.3 and 2.4 showed that the implications
of fiscal consolidation for consumption and leisure are very different in the
short and the long run. Therefore, we also assess the welfare impact of the
transition and the final steady state separately. To do so we first compute
final steady state welfare, given by:
Vo,ss =
1
1− β

ln((1 − h)C˜o, f )− χN
1+η
o, f
1 + η

 , (2.48)
Vr,ss =
1
1− β

ln((1 − h)C˜r, f )− χN
1+η
r, f
1 + η

 , (2.49)
Vss = (1− ζ)Vo,ss + ζVr,ss, (2.50)
where C˜o, f , C˜r, f , No, f and Nr, f denote final steady state values for consump-
tion and hours worked. By plugging in the final steady state welfare mea-
sures (Vo,ss and Vr,ss) on the left hand side of equations (2.42) and (2.43) we
can calculate the steady state change in welfare measured in consumption
equivalents as in equations (2.45) to (2.47). We denote these changes as λo,ss,
λr,ss and λss.
Finally, the welfare effects of the transition in consumption equivalence
units can be computed by subtracting the steady state welfare effects from
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the overall welfare effects:
λo,tr = λo − λo,ss, (2.51)
λr,tr = λr − λr,ss, (2.52)
λtr = λ− λss. (2.53)
2.6.2 Welfare results
Table 2.4 shows the welfare effects of fiscal consolidation in consumption
equivalence units.10,11 The overall welfare effects amount to the equivalence
of permanent changes in consumption between -0.13 percent and 0.01 per-
cent. Per capita personal consumption expenditures in the US were 36289
dollar in 2013 so that the welfare changes in consumption equivalence units
correspond to a range between -47 dollar (−0.0013 ∗ 36289 $) and +4 dollar
(0.0001 ∗ 36289 $) per person per annum. Hence, the overall welfare effects
are slightly negative except for fiscal consolidation via the labor tax rate.
Looking at the welfare effects of the steady state and the transition shows,
however, much larger values than the overall effects. While the steady state
welfare effects are mostly negative, the welfare effects of the transition are
mostly positive.12
10Our measure of welfare is standard in quantitative business cycle models. It implies that
an increase in hours worked reduces welfare and vice versa. In some models with involun-
tary unemployment labor market fluctuation are modelled only at the extensive margin. In
this case the effect of hours worked on welfare is missing.
11The results are computed for the case without ZLB restriction on nominal interest rates.
We do not analyse welfare effects under the ZLB because a binding ZLB even increases
welfare slightly in five out of the six scenarios. This is caused by the larger reduction in hours
worked, i.e. a larger increase in leisure, while the additional negative effects on consumption
are less strong.
12The differences between transitional and steady state welfare effects can be interpreted
as a rough indication of intergenerational distributional welfare consequences. As the con-
vergence to the final steady state takes in several cases very long, the steady state effects
concern future generations more than current generations, while the transitional welfare
consequences impact only current generations.
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Table 2.4: Welfare effects of fiscal consolidation
CG IG TR τ
c τn τk
λ -0.13 -0.04 -0.01 -0.09 0.01 -0.04
λss -0.60 -0.10 -0.05 -0.26 -0.33 0.10
λtr 0.47 0.06 0.03 0.17 0.34 -0.15
λo -0.16 -0.06 -0.02 -0.11 0.02 -0.10
λo,ss -0.69 -0.20 -0.15 -0.35 -0.43 0.05
λo,tr 0.54 0.13 0.13 0.24 0.45 -0.16
λr -0.04 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.14
λr,ss -0.32 0.17 0.27 0.03 -0.01 0.25
λr,tr 0.28 -0.15 -0.26 -0.03 0.00 -0.12
Welfare-based rank (ss) 6. 3. 2. 4. 5. 1.
Output-based rank (ss) 4./5. 1. 6. 4./5. 3. 2.
Notes: λ, λss and λtr denote the overall, steady state and transitional welfare effects of a
fiscal consolidation in consumption equivalence units. The subscripts o and r denote the
respective measures for optimizing and credit-constrained households. Positive numbers
imply an increase in welfare, while negative numbers imply a decrease in welfare. The last
two rows rank the steady state effects of the different consolidation scenarios according
to their welfare output effects.
The steady state welfare effects reflect the changes in consumption and
hours worked in table 2.2. A long-run reduction of capital taxes has the most
favorable effect. Welfare increases by the same amount that a permanent con-
sumption increase of 0.1 percent would cause. On the one hand, this is due to
the positive long-run effect on output, which leads to a substantial increase
in consumption. On the other hand, the long-run reduction in the capital tax
rate leads to a production structure that is more capital intensive. In conse-
quence, hours worked increase only moderately, so that the associated wel-
fare losses are small. All other consolidation strategies lead to lower overall
welfare for the steady state comparison. The largest drop in welfare is asso-
ciated with government consumption. In this case not only the increase in
hours worked, but also the considerable crowding-out of private consump-
tion leads to a large drop of welfare in consumption equivalence units of 0.6
percent which corresponds to -218 dollars per person per annum.13 For the
other fiscal instruments the reduction in welfare ranges from 0.05 percent
for transfers to 0.33 percent for labor taxes. These fiscal instruments have in
13It is important to mention that for this simulation we assume that government con-
sumption does not provide utility to households.
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common that the long-run increase in consumption is not sufficient to com-
pensate the drop in welfare associated with the increase in hours worked.
For the transition period the results change dramatically compared to the
steady state welfare effects. The government consumption scenario leads to a
0.47 percent increase in welfare, whereas the capital tax scenario causes a 0.15
percent decrease. The main reason for large welfare difference for these two
instruments is the short-run response of consumption. As shown in figure
2.6 the path of aggregate consumption for the capital tax base consolidation
is below the path of consumption for the government consumption scenario.
For the remaining four instruments the transitional welfare effects are posi-
tive owing to the temporary increase in leisure.
It is worthwhile to compare the welfare effects of the two household types.
Based on overall welfare optimizers are negatively affected by most fiscal
consolidation strategies, while the overall welfare impact on credit-
constrained households is close to zero for most consolidation strategies.
During the transition, however, credit-constrained households are mostly
negatively affected, while optimizers’ welfare increases. As one can easily
see in figures 2.1 to 2.6, the reason for this is that optimizers are able to
smooth their consumption path during the transition period, whereas credit-
constrained households can only rely on their current labor income to finance
consumption. With respect to steady state welfare credit-constrained house-
holds are better of than optimizing households. As both household types
work the same amount of hours the reason for these differences must be
routed in the consumption response. Table 2.2 shows that the percentage
steady state increase in consumption is indeed larger for credit-constrained
households than for optimizing households. This is because optimizing
households also increase their investment spending to build up the capital
stock needed for production. In this sense credit-constrained households
benefit from the increase of output due to the higher capital stock, which
is solely financed by the optimizing households.
2.6.3 Comparison of the output and welfare impact of fiscal
consolidation
In the short run, it might be misleading for a policy maker to judge the effec-
tiveness of a consolidation plan solely by taking overall output effects into
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account. For example, in section 2.4 we found that a transfer based consol-
idation barely reduces output during the transition to the final steady state.
But with respect to welfare we find that credit-constrained households suffer
substantial welfare losses (-0.26 percent), while optimizing households gain
welfare (0.13 percent). These differences are rooted in the different consump-
tion responses of households. In addition, this redistribution among the two
household types is not visible when looking only at aggregate welfare. On
the aggregate, the aforementioned welfare effects cancel out to a large extent
so that welfare is slightly positive (0.03 percent) during the transition. We
also found that a labor tax based consolidation leads to large and persistent
output reduction during the first years of the consolidation. At the same
time we observe that such a consolidation strategy involves substantial over-
all welfare gains during the transition to the final steady. This is because the
drop in output is associated with a reduction in hours worked. In this case,
output and welfare effects run into opposite directions. For a policy maker,
these two examples highlight the need for a careful design of a consolidation
plan because output and welfare effects might run into opposite directions
and different household types might be affected very differently.
Similarly, the steady state welfare and output effects are very different.
While the long-run output effects are positive for all fiscal instruments, the
steady state welfare effects are negative except for the capital tax rate sce-
nario. The last two rows of table 2.4 rank the different consolidation instru-
ments based on long-run output and steady state welfare effects. A capital
tax based consolidation leads to an increase in the capital intensity of pro-
duction and therefore has favorable effects from a welfare and an output
perspective. For most of the other instruments the long-run increase in hours
and output is the same. So, a large increase in hours leads to a large increase
in output, but also to large welfare costs.
Overall, the welfare and output based fiscal consolidation effects are quite
different. We want to stress these crucial differences as the debate has so
far mainly focused on output developments, but from an economic point of
view welfare effects are at least as important.
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2.6.4 Welfare effects with utility enhancing government
consumption
Our previous analysis of output effects of fiscal consolidation via govern-
ment consumption showed that it matters crucially for the results whether
or not government consumption provides utility to households. Table 2.5
shows the welfare results for a consolidation via government consumption
for the baseline case and if government consumption provides utility as a
substitute or complement to private consumption.
Table 2.5: Welfare effects of utility enhancing government consumption
baseline (κc = 1) substitutes (κc = 0.75, ν = 1.5) complements (κc = 0.75, ν = 0.5)
λ -0.13 -0.05 -0.14
λss -0.60 -0.06 -0.17
λtr 0.47 0.02 0.03
λo -0.16 -0.06 -0.19
λo,ss -0.69 -0.14 -0.22
λo,tr 0.54 0.08 0.03
λr -0.04 0.00 -0.01
λr,ss -0.32 0.16 -0.01
λr,tr 0.28 -0.20 -0.02
Notes: See table 2.4.
The results show that if government consumption provides utility overall
welfare is mainly determined by the steady state welfare effects, while the
transition has almost no effect on welfare at all. Here, it is important to recall
that the consumption bundle C˜ that consists of private and public consump-
tion is the relevant variable for the evaluation of the consumption impact
on welfare if κc < 1. In the substitution case the transitional movements in
consumption and hours worked are small as shown in figure 2.1. In the com-
plement case the large transitory decrease in consumption is accompanied by
a large transitory decrease in hours worked, i.e. an increase in leisure, so that
these two effects cancel out each other in terms of the welfare impact. For the
steady state welfare effects the long-run increase in government consump-
tion leads to an increase of C˜ in the final steady state. This increase is much
stronger if private and public consumption are complements compared to
the case where they are substitutes. Hours worked also increase in the final
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steady state in both cases—though much less in the substitution case—, so
that the overall welfare impact is still negative.
2.7 Conclusions
We have analysed fiscal consolidation in a dynamic general equilibrium
model. Using one coherent framework makes the effects of different but con-
nected aspects—including many fiscal instruments, the zero lower bound
on interest rates and a welfare analysis—directly comparable. The results
show that the choice of the consolidation instrument is very important. In-
struments that lead to a reduction of either the private or the public capital
stock lead to very pronounced and persistent output contractions, while the
short-run output costs for other consolidation strategies are much smaller.
While a binding zero lower bound on nominal interest rates increases short-
run output costs in particular for expenditure based fiscal consolidation, the
overall ranking of consolidation strategies in terms of short-run output costs
does not change. We find that fiscal consolidation affects consumption of
credit-constrained households more than of optimizing households for all
six considered fiscal instruments. This leads to a negative welfare impact on
credit-constrained households during the transition for most consolidation
scenarios. In contrast, in the long run credit-constrained households bene-
fit more from fiscal consolidation. Output increases due to the additional
fiscal space caused by lower required interest rate payments by the govern-
ment. Optimizing households need to use part of their additional income to
invest in physical capital to support the increase in steady state output, while
credit-constrained households can consume all additional income.
We analyse fiscal consolidation via one instrument at a time to clearly sep-
arate the effects of different instruments. For a practical fiscal consolidation
plan policymakers can use the analysis to come up with a consolidation plan
that consists of a combination of different fiscal instruments. For example, a
plan that would avoid a large short-run output contraction and lead to a sub-
stantial long-run increase in output, would consist of temporary cuts in gov-
ernment consumption, transfers or a temporary increase in the consumption
tax rate and long-run cuts in the labor or capital tax rate and an increase in
government investment. To avoid large negative distributional and welfare
effects, such a plan should specifically include those categories of govern-
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ment consumption and transfers, that affect credit-constrained households
less than fully optimizing households. To further mitigate short-run negative
consequences, one can phase in capital tax cuts or increases in government
investment early on and not only in the long run. Such a combined strategy
might be particularly useful if fiscal consolidation needs to be done when the
zero lower bound on nominal interest rate binds and short-run output costs
are potentially large.
The analysis in our paper is conducted under perfect foresight. A per-
fectly credible policy plan can lead to an increase in consumption of optimiz-
ing households even in the short-run if a long-run income increase is antici-
pated. If a policy plan is not fully credible, then such positive effects might be
smaller. Hence, in reality a clear commitment to a fiscal consolidation plan is
important. Furthermore, in reality political economy aspects might influence
the way a consolidation plan is set up. In particular, it might be difficult to
reverse a temporary increase in tax rates. If this is the case and households
anticipate that a final tax cut is unlikely, then the negative consequences in
terms of output and welfare can increase. Thus, for practical applications
such restrictions on the feasibility of a plan need to be taken into account.
For future work, the analysis of fiscal consolidation plans without perfect
credibility or perfect foresight is of interest. Further, extending our analy-
sis to additional instruments would be helpful. For example, government
spending on eduction might increase human capital and enhance the long-
term productivity of the workforce. In addition the inclusion of involuntary
unemployment would be interesting for two reasons. First, it would be inter-
esting to study how the welfare implications change if not all adjustments of
labor are done along the intensive margin. Second, one could study changes
in the requirement for unemployment benefits which might affect the natu-
ral rate of unemployment and the long-run output level. Finally, while our
model includes a constant share of credit-constrained households, in reality
fiscal consolidation might change this share. Therefore, modeling fiscal con-
solidation with heterogenous agents and an endogenously changing share of
credit-constrained households would be very interesting.
2.8 References
Alesina, A. and S. Ardagna (2010). Large changes in fiscal policy: Taxes ver-
sus spending. In J. R. Brown (Ed.), Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 24,
62
pp. 35–68. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Almeida, V., G. Castro, R. M. Félix, and J. R. Maria (2013). Fiscal consolidation
in a small euro-area economy. International Journal of Central Banking 9(4),
1–38.
Angeloni, I., E. Faia, and R. Winkler (2014). Exit strategies. European Economic
Review 70, 231–257.
Baxter, M. and R. G. King (1993). Fiscal policy in general equilibrium. The
American Economic Review 83(3), 315–334.
Bouakez, H. and N. Rebei (2007). Why does private consumption rise after a
government spending shock? Canadian Journal of Economics 40(3), 954–979.
Buttiglione, L., P. R. Lane, , L. Reichlin, and V. Reinhart (2014). Deleveraging?
What Deleveraging? 16th Geneva Report on the World Economy.
Carvalho, V. M. and M. M. F. Martins (2011). Macroeconomic effects of fis-
cal consolidations in a DSGE model for the euro area: does composition
matter? FEP Working Paper 421.
Chetty, R., A. Guren, D. Manoli, and A. Weber (2011). Are micro and macro
labor supply elasticities consistent? A review of evidence on the intensive
and extensive margins. The American Economic Review 101(3), 471–475.
Christiano, L., M. Eichenbaum, and S. Rebelo (2011). When is the govern-
ment spending multiplier large? Journal of Political Economy 119(1), 78–121.
Christiano, L. J., M. Eichenbaum, and C. L. Evans (2005). Nominal rigidities
and the dynamic effects of a shock to monetary policy. Journal of Political
Economy 113(1), 1–45.
Coenen, G., M. Mohr, and R. Straub (2008). Fiscal consolidation in the euro
area: Long-run benefits and short-run costs. Economic Modelling 25, 912–
932.
Coenen, G., R. Straub, and M. Trabandt (2012). Fiscal policy and the Great
Recession in the euro area. American Economic Review 102(3), 71–76.
Coenen, G., R. Straub, and M. Trabandt (2013). Gauging the effects of fis-
cal stimulus packages in the euro area. Journal of Economic Dynamics and
Control 37(2), 367–386.
Cogan, J. F., T. Cwik, J. B. Taylor, and V. Wieland (2010). New Keynesian ver-
sus old Keynesian government spending multipliers. Journal of Economic
Dynamics and Control 34(3), 281–295.
Cogan, J. F., J. B. Taylor, V. Wieland, and M. H. Wolters (2013a). Fiscal consol-
idation strategies. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 37(2), 404–421.
63
Cogan, J. F., J. B. Taylor, V. Wieland, and M. H. Wolters (2013b). Fiscal con-
solidation strategy: An update for the budget reform proposal of march
2013,. IMFS Working Paper No. 68.
Corsetti, G., K. Kuester, A. Meier, and G. J. Müller (2013). Sovereign risk,
fiscal policy, and macroeconomic stability. The Economic Journal 123(566),
F99–F132.
Drautzburg, T. and H. Uhlig (2011). Fiscal stimulus and distortionary taxa-
tion. NBER Working Papers 17111.
Eggertsson, G. (2010). What fiscal policy is effective at zero interest rates?
NBER Macroeconomics Annual 25, 59–112.
Erceg, C. J., D. W. Henderson, and A. T. Levin (2000). Optimal monetary
policy with staggered wage and price contracts. Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics 46(2), 281–313.
Erceg, C. J. and J. Lindé (2013). Fiscal consolidation in a currency union:
Spending cuts vs. tax hikes. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 37(2),
422–445.
Forni, L., A. Gerali, and M. Pisani (2010). The macroeconomics of fiscal con-
solidations in euro area countries. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Con-
trol 34(9), 1791–1812.
Furlanetto, F. (2011). Fiscal stimulus and the role of wage rigidity. Journal of
Economic Dynamics and Control 35, 512–527.
Giavazzi, F. and M. Pagano (1990). Can severe fiscal contractions be expan-
sionary? Tales of two small european countries. In O. Blanchard and S. Fis-
cher (Eds.), NBERMacroeconomics Annual, pp. 75–110. MIT Press.
Giavazzi, F. and M. Pagano (1996). Non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy
changes: International evidence and the Swedish experience. Swedish Eco-
nomic Policy Review 3, 67–103.
Guajardo, J., D. Leigh, and A. Pescatori (2014). Expansionary austerity? New
international evidence. Journal of the European Economic Association 12(4),
949–968.
in ’t Veld, J. (2013). Fiscal consolidations and spillovers in the euro area pe-
riphery and core. European Commission Economic Papers 506.
Jordà, O. and A. M. Taylor (2013). The time for austerity: Estimating the
average treatment effect of fiscal policy. NBER Working Paper 19414.
Leeper, E. M., M. Plante, and N. Traum (2010). Dynamics of fiscal financing
in the United States. Journal of Econometrics 156, 304–321.
64
Mendoza, E. G., A. Razin, and L. L. Tesar (1994). Effective tax rates in macroe-
conomics: cross-country estimates of tax rates on factor incomes and con-
sumption. Journal of Monetary Economics 34(3), 297–323.
Perotti, R. (2012). The "austerity myth": Gain without pain? In NBER Chap-
ter: Fiscal Policy after the Financial Crisis, pp. 307–354. National Bureau of
Economic Research.
Perotti, R. (2014). Defense government spending is contractionary, civilian
government spending is expansionary. NBER Working Paper 20179.
Philippopoulos, A., P. Varthalitis, and V. Varssilatos (2014). Fiscal consol-
idation in an open economy with sovereign premia. Athens University
Working Paper 4-2014.
Prescott, E. C. (2002). Prosperity and depression. American Economic Re-
view 92(2), 1–15.
Prescott, E. C. (2004). Why do Americans work so much more than Euro-
peans? Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 28, 2–13.
Ramey, V. A. (2011). Identifying government spending shocks: It’s all in the
timing. Quarterly Journal of Economics 126(1), 1–50.
Roeger, W. and J. in ’t Veld (2013). Expected sovereign defaults and fiscal
consolidations. European Commission Economic Papers 479.
Schmitt-Grohé, S. and M. Uribe (2006). Optimal fiscal and monetary policy in
a medium-scale macroeconomic model. In M. Gertler and K. Rogoff (Eds.),
NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2005. MIT Press: Cambridge MA.
Schwarzmüller, T. and M. H. Wolters (2014). The short-and long-run effects
of fiscal consolidation in dynamic general equilibrium. unpublished.
Stähler, N. and C. Thomas (2012). FiMod - a DSGE model for fiscal policy
simulations. Economic Modelling 29(2), 239–261.
Trabandt, M. and H. Uhlig (2011). The Laffer Curve revisited. Journal of
Monetary Economics 58(4), 305–327.
65
Chapter 3
Model pooling and changes in the
informational content of predictors:
an empirical investigation for the
euro area
Abstract
I study the performance of single predictor bridge equation models as well
as a wide range of model selection and pooling techniques, including Mal-
lows model averaging and Cross-Validation model averaging, for short-term
forecasting euro area GDP growth. I explore to what extent model selection
and model pooling techniques are able to outperform a simple autoregres-
sive benchmark model in the periods before, during and after the Great Re-
cession. I find that single predictor bridge equation models suffer a great
variation in the forecast performance relative to the benchmark model over
the analysed sub-samples. Moreover, model selection techniques turn out to
produce quite poor forecasts in some sub-samples. On the contrary, model
pooling based on the Cross-Validation and the Mallows criterion provide a
very stable and accurate forecast performance.
Keywords: Short-term forecasting, Great Recession, mixed frequency data,
model selection and model pooling.
JEL-Codes: C53, E37.
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3.1 Introduction
Short-term forecasting of GDP is an important task to guide policy makers.
Central banks need to assess the current state of the economy to conduct
monetary policy. Governments incorporate forecasts of economic activity
into their budgetary procedures and international organizations rely on fore-
casts to provide guidance to their stakeholders.
Models used for short-term forecasting should be able to deal with data ir-
regularities that may emerge from different publication delays of the predic-
tor variables. In the forecasting literature this is known as the ’ragged-edge’
problem. Another difficulty arises because of different sampling frequencies.
For example, GDP is available only at quarterly frequency whereas many
business cycle indicators are available on a monthly basis. For a detailed
discussion of these issues see e.g. Giannone et al. (2008).
Bridge equation (BE) models provide a simple framework to deal with
these data irregularities and are frequently used in policy institutions (see
e.g. Kitchen and Monaco (2003), Sédillot and Pain (2003) or ECB (2008)). One
reason for their widespread use in applied work is that BE models allow for
an economic interpretation of the forecast, because they are typically parame-
terized parsimoniously as described by Diron (2008) and Antipa et al. (2012).
The usefulness of the BE model approach to forecast euro area GDP growth
is documented in Baffigi et al. (2004), Golinelli and Parigi (2007), Rünstler
et al. (2009), Angelini et al. (2011) and Foroni and Marcellino (2014).1
The Great Recession and the global financial crisis have led to a large
downturn in world economic activity. Furthermore, many euro area coun-
tries experienced a double-dip recession due the emergence of the sovereign-
debt crisis. Professional forecasters were heavily criticized for providing very
poor forecasts during this period. From a forecasters’ perspective this cri-
tique might seem unfair because it is well known that crisis events can lead
to model and parameter instabilities which are hard to detect in real-time.
Therefore, as pointed out recently by Timmerman and van Dijk (2013), one
of the main challenges of the forecasting profession is to identify robust meth-
1Of course, there are alternative short-term forecasting techniques, besides the BE model,
that perform well in forecasting euro area GDP growth. See e.g. Kuzin et al. (2011) for the use
of mixed-frequency vector autoregressions (MF-VAR) and mixed data sampling (MIDAS)
models, Foroni and Marcellino (2014) for the use of factor augmented MIDAS models or
Ban´bura and Rünstler (2011) for the use of a dynamic factor model (DFM) in state space
form.
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ods to account for instabilities. These methods should be able to outperform
simple benchmark models over various periods of time.
The empirical literature studying the stability properties of different short-
term forecasting techniques for economic activity during recent crisis is still
in an early stage. From a theoretical point of view, the pooling of forecasts
provides a robust tool in the presence of instabilities (see Timmerman (2006)).
Recent papers by Kuzin et al. (2013) and Drechsel and Scheufele (2012) find
that model pooling is capable of outperforming simple benchmark models
in the period before and during the Great Recession. Schumacher (2014)
analyses the performance of single equation models for euro area GDP
growth. In particular, the paper focuses on a comparison of the BE and the
MIDAS modelling approach during and after the Great Recession.
I analyse the performance of single predictor BE models as well as model
selection and model pooling techniques for short-term forecasting euro area
GDP growth. In a recursive forecast evaluation exercise I analyse to what ex-
tent single predictors are able to outperform a simple autoregressive bench-
mark model in the period before, during and after the Great Recession in
terms of the relative mean squared forecast error (MSFE). Therefore, I define
three evaluation sub-samples, namely the period before the Great Recession
(Q1:2003-Q4:2007), the period during the Great Recession (Q1:2008-Q4:2009)
and the period after the Great Recession (Q1:2010-Q4:2013). Furthermore,
I discuss to what extent model selection and model pooling techniques are
able to outperform the simple benchmark model in these three sub-samples.
The first contribution of the paper is to study in detail how the importance
of different groups of predictor variables (e.g. survey data, monetary and
financial data, etc.) changes over the three sub-samples. So far, the exist-
ing literature is quite silent about what types of predictors performed well
before, during and after the Great Recession in the euro area.
The second contribution of the paper is to analyse empirically whether
model selection or model pooling techniques are robust to changes in the
informational content of single predictors. In this regard, the results pre-
sented here can be seen as an extension to the work of Kuzin et al. (2013),
who analysed the forecast performance of model pooling and model selec-
tion techniques for six industrialized countries. In particular, I apply Cross-
Validation and Mallows model averaging for the case of ragged-edge and
mixed frequency data. These techniques were proposed in a series of papers
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by Hansen (2007, 2008, 2010) and Hansen and Racine (2012), but so far are
rarely used in applied work, despite their theoretical property to minimize
forecast risk. I compare these pooling techniques to five other pooling tech-
niques which are frequently used in the existing literature, namely, weights
based on the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian informa-
tion criterion (BIC), weights based on past forecast performance and simple
equal weight averaging and the median. The usefulness of sequential model
selection using information criteria was put forward e.g. by Inoue and Kilian
(2006).
Certain model pooling techniques such as Cross-Validation and Mallows
model averaging allow to identify the importance of certain predictors in
real-time by looking at the model weights. Therefore, the final contribution
is to discuss the evolution of the model weights assigned to specific groups
of predictor variables over the three sub-samples. In doing so, it is possible
to identify the main driving forces of the pooled forecast. From a forecasters
perspective this issue is very important because the forecaster typically is
not only interested in forecasting a single number but also in providing an
economic interpretation of the forecast.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 presents
the BE model used for forecasting and explains the model pooling techniques.
In section 3.3, I describe the forecast evaluation design and the dataset. In
Section 3.4 the results of the forecasting exercise are discussed and finally
section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Forecast models
3.2.1 Single predictor BE models
For each predictor variable m = 1, ..., M, I estimate a single BE model ac-
cording to equation (3.1). Yt+h is the quarterly growth rate of real GDP and
h = {1, 2} is the forecast horizon. c is a constant and Yt−i denotes lagged
values of the dependent variable. The forecast is obtained using the direct
step method. The monthly predictors are released three times during a quar-
ter. Each time a new monthly observation becomes available I adjust the
construction of the quarterly series derived from the monthly predictor. In
equation (3.1), this quarterly series is represented by Xmd,t+1. For this regressor
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the subscript d = 0, 1, 2, 3 denotes the number of available monthly observa-
tions at the current data edge. For d = 0, no monthly observation is available
and consequently the regressor drops from the regression. For d = 1, 2, 3
the average of the available monthly observations is used to construct Xmd,t+1,
the quarterly series. Xm3,t−j denotes lagged values of the predictor for which
all monthly observations are available. emt+h are the model residuals and T
denotes the number of observations used for the estimation.
Yt+h = c+
p
∑
i=0
γiYt−i + αX
m
d,t+1 +
q
∑
j=0
δjX
m
3,t−j + e
m
t+h. (3.1)
I estimate the BE model using ordinary least squares. The model specification
is based on the BIC, allowing for pmax = 1 and qmax = 2. For later reference,
it is convenient to re-write the forecast model into a more compact form:
Yt+h = Z
m
t β
m + emt+h, (3.2)
where Zmt is a 1× k vector of regressors and β
m is a k× 1 vector of coefficients.
The out-of-sample forecast of an individual model m is given by YˆmT+h =
ZmT βˆ
m.
Since the focus of the analysis is on the stability of the forecasting perfor-
mance, I do not forecast missing values of the predictor at the current data
edge to fill the missing monthly observations. Otherwise, it would not be
possible to assess if a change in the forecasting performance of a predictor
is due to a change in the information content of the predictor or to a change
in the forecastability of the predictor itself at the current data edge. Instead,
I follow Kitchen and Monaco (2003) or Drechsel and Maurin (2011) and re-
estimate equation (3.1) whenever new information on the predictor becomes
available.
3.2.2 Pooling techniques
In general, the combined forecast of each pooling technique is obtained by
calculating a weighted average over all individual model forecasts, i.e.:
Yˆ
pool
T+h =
M
∑
m=1
wˆmT+hYˆ
m
T+h, (3.3)
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where wˆmT+h is the estimated weight assigned to model m.
Overall, I use seven pooling techniques: equal weighted averaging (EWA),
the median, AIC weights (AICw), BIC weights (BICw), weights based on
past forecast performance (MSEw), Mallows model averaging (MMA) and
Cross - Validation model averaging (CVMA).
As shown by Stock and Watson (2003, 2004) EWA and the median perform
well, despite their simplicity. For EWA, the model weights are wm = w = 1M .
The other pooling techniques are described in more detail below.
AIC and BIC model averaging
The use of the AIC for model combination was put forward by Buckland
et al. (1997) and Burnham and Anderson (2002). The AIC weight for model
m is
wmT+h =
exp(− 12 ∆AIC
m
T+h)
∑
M
l=1 exp(−
1
2 ∆AIC
l
T+h)
, (3.4)
where ∆AICmT+h = AIC
m
T+h−AIC
min
T+h is the difference between the AIC of in-
dicator model m and the indicator model with the smallest AIC. The AICmT+h
is computed as:
AICmT+h = T ln((σˆ
m)2) + 2 km (3.5)
where (σˆm)2 = 1/T ∑Tt+h=1(eˆ
m
t+h)
2 is an estimate for the error variance of
model m and km is the number of regressors. Other forecast evaluation stud-
ies using the AIC weights are e.g. Kapetanios et al. (2008) or Drechsel and
Maurin (2011).
As an alternative, it is also possible to calculate the weights using the BIC
(see e.g. Hansen (2007) and Hansen (2008))
wmT+h =
exp(− 12 ∆BIC
m
T+h)
∑
M
l=1 exp(−
1
2 ∆BIC
l
T+h)
, (3.6)
where ∆BICmT+h = BIC
m
T+h − BIC
min
T+h is the difference between the BIC of in-
dicator model m and the indicator model with the smallest BIC. The BICmT+h
is computed as:
BICmT+h = T ln((σˆ
m)2) + km ln(T) (3.7)
and (σˆm)2 is defined as above.
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MSE weights
The idea of pooling models according to their past forecast performance was
introduced by Bates and Granger (1969). Following Timmerman (2006) the
MSE weights are computed as:
wmT+h =
1/MSEmT+h
∑
M
l=1 1/MSE
l
T+h
, (3.8)
with
MSEmT+h =
1
v
T
∑
t+h=T−v+1
(emt+h)
2. (3.9)
The sequence of out-of-sample errors, emt+h, are computed over the last v
available quarters. As in Kuzin et al. (2013) I calculate the MSE over the
previous four quarters, i.e. v = 4.
Mallows model averaging (MMA)
The Mallows Cp criterion for model selection was introduced by Mallows
(1973). The idea of using the Mallows criterion for model pooling was in-
troduced by Hansen (2007). Hansen (2008) shows that using the Mallows
criterion for model pooling provides an asymptotically unbiased estimator
for the mean squared forecast error when the observations are stationary
time-series. The Mallows criterion for selecting the weights is defined as the
penalized sum of the squared residuals
CT+h(w) = w
′eˆ′eˆw + 2σ˜2w′K, (3.10)
where w = [w1, ...,wM]′ is the weighting vector, and eˆ = [eˆ1, ..., eˆM] is a ma-
trix containing the in-sample errors of the individual models to be combined.
The vector K = [k1, ..., kM]′ contains the number of regressors included in
each of the individual models and σ˜2 = 1T−kmax ∑
T
t=1(eˆ
kmax
t+h )
2 is an estimate
of the error variance of the model with the largest number of regressors,
kmax . The MMA weighting vector w is obtained by minimizing CT+h(w).
As pointed out by Hansen (2008), to get feasible values for w it is necessary
to impose two additional restrictions for the minimization. First, the weights
should sum up to one. Second, the weights should only take values between
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zero and one. Accordingly, the MMA weighting vector is defined as:
wˆ = argmin CT+h(w) (3.11)
s.t.
M
∑
m=1
wmT+h = 1 (3.12)
0 ≤ wmT+h ≤ 1 (3.13)
This is a quadratic programming problem which can not be solved analyti-
cally.2
Cross-Validation Model Averaging (CVMA)
The Cross-Validation (CV) criterion for model selection was introduced by
Allen (1974), Geisser (1974) and Stone (1974). The idea of using the CV crite-
rion for model pooling was put forward by Hansen and Racine (2012), who
proposed a "jackknife model averaging" (JMA) estimator to obtain the model
weights for one-step ahead forecasts. The advantage of JMA over the Mal-
lows criterion is that it does not require the error terms, emt+h, to be condition-
ally homoskedastic. Hansen (2010) generalized this framework to allow also
for multi-step ahead forecasting by introducing Cross-Validation model av-
eraging (CVMA), which relaxes the assumption that the errors terms need to
be serially uncorrelated. For a forecast horizon of h=1, JMA and CVMA de-
liver the same model weights. The CVMA criterion for selecting the weights
is
CVMAT+h,h(w) =
1
T
w′e˜′he˜hw, (3.14)
where w is the weighting vector defined as above and e˜h = [e˜
1
h, ..., e˜
M
h ] is a
matrix containing the leave-h-out residuals of the individual models to be
combined. The leave-h-out residual of model m for observation t is defined
as
e˜mt+h,h = Yt+h − Z
m
t β˜
m
t,h, (3.15)
where β˜mt,h is the coefficient vector obtained from regression (3.1) leaving out
the observations {t − h + 1, ..., t + h − 1}. For further details the reader is
referred to Hansen (2010).
2The MATLAB program quadprog provides numerical algorithms to solve these kind of
problems.
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The CVMAT+h,h weight vector is then defined as:
wˆ = argmin CVMAT+h,h(w) (3.16)
s.t.
M
∑
m=1
wmT+h = 1 (3.17)
0 ≤ wmT+h ≤ 1 (3.18)
MMA and CVMA have in common that they explicitly explore the co-variance
structure of the forecast errors to minimize forecast risk. This is an distin-
guishing feature with respect to the other model pooling techniques used in
this paper. Therefore, one can think of these pooling techniques in a simi-
lar way as of an investor who wants to minimize the risk of an investment
portfolio.
3.3 Data and forecasting design
3.3.1 Dataset
The dataset for the euro area consists of a quarterly real GDP series from
Q1:1991 to Q4:2013 and 39 predictor variables available at monthly frequency
over a sample ranging from M1:1991 to M12:2013. All series are seasonally
adjusted. The predictor variables include sentiment indicators, indicators of
real economic activity as well as monetary and financial variables. For con-
venience, I distinguish five broad data categories: Survey data (SD), hard
business cycle data (HD), monetary and financial data (MFD), international
data (ID) and the composite leading indicator (CLI) of the OECD. I decide
to put the CLI into a separate category because it is constructed using many
other data series as an input. The data sources are the European Commis-
sion, Eurostat, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the OECD. The data
for euro area GDP provided by Eurostat is only available from Q1:1995 on-
wards. I therefore backdate the missing values using the Area-wide Model
(AWM) database provided by the ECB. Monthly data for production in con-
struction, retail trade volumes and the harmonized unemployment rate are
not available either for the whole time period at the primary source. In or-
der to backdate the missing values for these variables I use the December
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2012 edition of the OECD original release data and revisions database. A
detailed list of all predictor variables, data transformations and data sources
can be found in the appendix. I use a final revised dataset and not a real-time
dataset. Thus, the impact of data revisions is not addressed in the analysis.
However, Diron (2008) finds that pseudo real-time exercises of forecasting
euro area GDP growth overall provide reliable results. In addition, the stud-
ies of Faust and Wright (2009) and Wolters (2015) find that the ranking of
different forecasting models hardly changes when using revised or real-time
data.
3.3.2 Evaluation design
The forecast evaluation is performed using a pseudo real-time design. This
approach replicates the availability pattern of the data at the time the forecast
is computed. In general, the availability of the data at a specific information
set differs with respect to the indicator groups, e.g. sentiment indicators are
typically available more timely than industrial production data. To mimic
the ragged-edge data structure in the forecasting experiment I follow the re-
cent literature (e.g. Giannone et al. (2008), Ban´bura and Rünstler (2011) and
Marcellino and Schumacher (2010)) and store the missing data values at the
end of the sample at the date of the download. In the evaluation exercise,
the GDP forecast is updated on a bi-weekly basis. Therefore, I downloaded
the data twice (on the 5th June 2014 and on the 20th June 2014). Table 3.1
shows the delays of the most prominent predictor series.3 For example at
the beginning of June 2014 sentiment indicators are available until May 2014,
whereas industrial production data is only available until March 2014. Two
weeks later one more observation becomes available for industrial produc-
tion, since it is published roughly 45 days after the end of the month. For
GDP, which is a quarterly variable and not listed here, I impose that a new
observation becomes available 45 days after the end of the respective quarter.
This is in line with the data release calendar of Eurostat. Moreover, I assume
that the data releases follow a fixed pattern throughout the whole forecast
evaluation. For the evaluation exercise I use the data vintage downloaded
on the 20th of June 2014.
3A detailed overview of the delays for all predictors can be found in table 3.6 in the
appendix.
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Table 3.1: Publication lags.
Variable Publishing lag at 5th day Publishing lag at 20th day
Economic sentiment 1 month 1 month
Business climate 1 month 1 month
Employment expectations 1 month 1 month
Industrial production 3 month 2 month
Retail sales 2 month 2 month
Car registrations 2 month 1 month
Money supply 2 month 2 month
Exchange rates 1 month 1 month
Stock index 1 month 1 month
Table 3.2 presents a typical forecasting round, which consists of 12 informa-
tion sets. Qt is the quarter the forecaster wishes to forecast. The first forecast
is made on the 20th day in the 2nd month in the quarter Qt−1, i.e. right after
the publication of GDP of Qt−2, using only data which is available at this
point in time. The forecast for GDP is then updated on a bi-weekly basis.
The forecasting round ends on the 5th day in the 2nd month in the quarter
Qt+1. This is roughly two weeks before the first estimate of GDP is published
by Eurostat. For information sets 1-6, the observation of GDP growth for the
quarter Qt−1 is not available for the forecaster. During a forecasting round
the single indicator models and the model weights are re-estimated for every
information set. The estimation sample expands recursively.4
Table 3.2: A typical forecasting round.
Forecast Information
Forecast made on
forecast
Quarter set (IS) horizon
Qt
1 Qt−1, 2nd Month, 20th day
h=2
2 Qt−1, 3rd Month, 5th day
3 Qt−1, 3rd Month, 20th day
4 Qt, 1st Month, 5th day
5 Qt, 1st Month, 20th day
6 Qt, 2nd Month, 5th day
7 Qt, 2nd Month, 20th day
h=1
8 Qt, 3rd Month, 5th day
9 Qt, 3rd Month, 20th day
10 Qt+1, 1st Month, 5th day
11 Qt+1, 1st Month, 20th day
12 Qt+1, 2nd Month, 5th day
4The use of a recursive scheme is done frequently in the existing literature studying
euro area growth, see e.g. Foroni and Marcellino (2014), Kuzin et al. (2011) or Drechsel and
Maurin (2011), among others.
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For the forecast evaluation I reserve the period from the first quarter of the
year 2003 (Q1:2003) until the fourth quarter of the year 2013 (Q4:2013). This
sample is further divided into three sub-samples, denoted as Si = S1, S2, S3,
in order to analyse the forecast performance for the periods before, during
and after the Great Recession. S1 ranges from Q1:2003 to Q4:2007, whereas
S2 covers the period during the Great Recession, which I define from Q1:2008
to Q4:2009. S3 covers the period from Q1:2010 to Q4:2013.
The forecast performance of a single indicator model, a model pooling or a
model selection technique is measured in terms of the mean squared forecast
error (MSFE) relative to the MSFE of an AR(1) benchmark model
rel. MSFE
Si
IS =
∑
T
Si
1
t+h=T
Si
0
(
Yt+h − Yˆt+h|IS
)2
∑
T
Si
1
t+h=T
Si
0
(
Yt+h − Yˆ
AR
t+h|IS
)2 . (3.19)
As shown in equation (3.19), the relative MSFE is computed separately for
each of the three sub - samples and for each of the 12 information sets. TSi0
and T
Si
1 refer to the beginning and the end of the respective evaluation sub-
sample and IS = 1,...,12 denotes the information set at which the forecast is
computed. Yt+h is the realization of GDP growth, Yˆt+h|IS is a forecast of a
single indicator model, a model pooling or a model selection technique and
YˆAR
t+h|IS is the forecast of the benchmark model. Both forecasts only incor-
porate information which are available at the point in time the forecast is
computed.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Assessing changes in the informational content of
predictors
It is well known that the informational content of a single predictor variable
might vary over time. In order to get a first impression to what extent this is
an issue for the euro area, figure 3.1 shows the share of BE models that out-
perform the AR(1) in terms of the MSFE for the period before (black dotted
line), during (black dashed line) and after (black solid line) the Great Reces-
sion. In the period before and after the Great Recession, roughly 20 to 40
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Figure 3.1: Share of single predictor BE models that outperform the bench-
mark.
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percent of the predictors provide some additional information, depending
on the information set. During the Great Recession this share becomes twice
as large, which can be seen as evidence in favor of the conjecture that the
informational content of predictors is subject to considerable changes. How-
ever, to shed some more light on this issue, I also report the share of single
predictor BE models which outperform the benchmark in each of the three
sub-samples (red solid line). The number of these models is very small and
ranges between 5 and 15 percent. Such an environment is quite challenging,
because a forecaster who selects a model that performs best over a particular
sample (say, during the Great Recession), might produce a very poor fore-
cast in the period after the Great Recession if the informational content of
this specific predictor changes. The noticeable kink that occurs when mov-
ing from information set 6 to 7 is due to the fact that the performance of
the benchmark model improves because one more observation for GDP be-
comes available for the forecaster. To further asses the forecast performance
of the BE models, table 3.3 reports summary statistics for a given informa-
tion set and over the three sub-samples. I follow Stock and Watson (2012)
and show the relative MSFE at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentile
of the distribution of the individual BE model forecasts. For the period be-
fore the Great Recession (Q1:2003-Q4:2007) the best 10 percent of the models
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are able to moderately outperform the benchmark. Depending on the infor-
mation set, the improvement over the benchmark ranges between 10 to 20
percent. The middle part of table 3.3 shows the results for the period during
the Great Recession. In this evaluation sample the MSFE of the benchmark
is much larger than for the period before the Great Recession. While the ab-
solute performance of all models deteriorates the relative performance with
respect the benchmark improves substantially. The best ten percent of the BE
models outperform the benchmark at least by 35 percent. At the end of the
forecasting round the relative MSFE is 0.18. The lower part of table 3.3 re-
ports the results for the period after the Great Recession (Q1:2010-Q4:2013).
In this evaluation period the MSFE of the benchmark model is much lower
than during the Great recession period, but still about twice as large as in the
period before the Great Recession. In terms of the relative MSFE the best ten
percent of the BE models perform better than in the period before the Great
Recession but worse compared to the period during the Great Recession.
Regarding the forecast performance of individual BE models I briefly sum-
marize the main findings.5 For the period before the Great Recession I find
that for information set 1 to 6 monetary and financial as well as survey in-
dicators, namely M1 and the stock index as well as the economic sentiment
indicator, the consumer confidence indicator and consumer employment ex-
pectations yield the largest gains over the benchmark model. The relative
MSFE of these variables is between 0.7 and 0.8. For information set 7 to 12,
the variables M1 and the stock index again clearly outperform the bench-
mark model, but also some hard business cycle indicators show a relative
MSFE below one. The industrial production of consumer non-durables and
new car registrations work quite well. Predictors that represent the interna-
tional environment barely outperform the benchmark model and also Com-
posite Leading Indicator (CLI) has a very poor forecast performance.
For the period during the Great Recession (Q1:2008-Q4:2009) I observe that
the ranking of the indicators changes a lot. The CLI shows large improve-
ments in the relative forecasting performance for all information sets. At the
end of the forecasting round the relative MSFE of this predictor is 0.35. Also
the relative performance of the indicators describing the international envi-
ronment improves. However, substantial gains are only present for informa-
5Detailed results for all individual models can be found in table 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9 in the
appendix.
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Table 3.3: Forecast performance of single predictor BE models.
IS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
h=2 h=1
Q1:2003-Q4:2007
AR(1)
MSFE MSFE
0.07 0.05
relative MSFE relative MSFE
percentile
10 0.83 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.81 0.84 0.85 0.80 0.80
25 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.94 1.00 0.98 0.98 0.95 0.91 0.91
50 1.08 1.08 1.11 1.07 1.04 1.04 1.13 1.07 1.07 1.06 1.04 1.04
75 1.24 1.21 1.16 1.16 1.19 1.20 1.28 1.27 1.20 1.20 1.15 1.13
90 1.31 1.31 1.28 1.28 1.33 1.33 1.38 1.38 1.30 1.30 1.28 1.25
Q1:2008-Q4:2009
AR(1)
MSFE MSFE
2.69 1.68
relative MSFE relative MSFE
percentile
10 0.62 0.58 0.57 0.52 0.52 0.48 0.64 0.60 0.35 0.35 0.18 0.18
25 0.88 0.82 0.75 0.73 0.68 0.67 0.82 0.80 0.65 0.59 0.58 0.57
50 1.00 0.99 0.90 0.89 0.82 0.82 0.96 0.96 0.84 0.76 0.71 0.71
75 1.05 1.05 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.98 1.06 1.04 0.98 0.96 0.93 0.93
90 1.22 1.19 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.26 1.16 1.10 1.08 1.08 1.07
Q1:2010-Q4:2013
AR(1)
MSFE MSFE
0.14 0.10
relative MSFE relative MSFE
percentile
10 0.86 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.68 0.80 0.79 0.68 0.62 0.65 0.71
25 0.98 1.02 1.03 1.05 1.04 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92
50 1.14 1.16 1.16 1.16 1.19 1.15 1.10 1.10 1.02 1.03 1.04 1.04
75 1.44 1.49 1.44 1.44 1.45 1.45 1.19 1.25 1.25 1.24 1.20 1.24
90 2.55 2.55 2.63 2.63 2.35 2.35 1.49 1.51 1.52 1.59 1.61 1.54
Notes: IS = information set, h = forecast horizon.
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tion sets 7 to 12. With respect to the hard business cycle indicators I find that
industrial production in manufacturing yields the best forecast performance
at the end of the forecasting round whereas industrial production of con-
sumer non-durables, which works quite well in the period before the Great
Recession, hardly beats the benchmark model. The forecast performance of
the surveys improves to a large extent. Nearly all considered indicators are
able to beat the benchmark model. However, there is no clear tendency in
favor of a specific indicator. Finally, for monetary and financial indicators
the improvement in the relative forecast performance is only limited. The
stock index and M1 show a relative MSFE which is very similar to the period
before the Great Recession.
For the period after the Great Recession (Q1:2010-Q4:2013) the monetary
aggregate M1 works quite well at all forecast horizons, whereas stock mar-
ket developments, which worked well in the period before and during the
Great Recession, seem to lose their informational content. The relative per-
formance of the surveys worsens compared to the period during the Great
Recession and only a few indicators have a MSFE lower than one. For in-
formation set 1 to 6 the economic sentiment and retail confidence indicator
as well as employment expectations in the retail sector show the best perfor-
mance whereas for information set 7 to 12 employment expectations in the
construction sector work well.
3.4.2 The forecast performance of model pooling techniques
The results from the previous section suggest that the informational content
of single predictors is subject to considerable changes. In the following I
therefore investigate to what extent model pooling techniques are able to
cope with this environment. In order to get an impression of the performance
of the model pooling techniques relative to the individual BE models, figure
3.2 plots the results for information set 9. This information set is of particu-
lar interest because it replicates a typical nowcast situation in which the first
month of industrial production data for the current quarter is available.6 On
the left hand side I plot the relative MSFE of the period before the Great Re-
cession against the relative MSFE of the period during the Great Recession.
6Scatter plots for the other information sets are give in figures 3.8 to 3.11 in the appendix.
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Figure 3.2: Relative MSFE comparison for information set 9.
0.8 1 1.2 1.4
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
before vs. during the Great Recession
relative MSFE − Q1:2003−Q4:2007
re
la
ti
v
e 
M
S
F
E
 −
 Q
1:
20
08
−
Q
4:
20
09
0.8 1 1.2 1.4
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
before vs. after the Great Recession
relative MSFE − Q1:2003−Q4:2007
re
la
ti
v
e 
M
S
F
E
 −
 Q
1:
20
10
−
Q
4:
20
13
Notes: Blue dots: single predictor BE models, red dots: CV and Mallows model averaging,
yellow dot: MSE weights, green dots: BIC and AIC weights, purple dots: equal weight
averaging and median.
On the right hand side I plot the relative MSFE of the period before the Great
Recession against the period after the Great Recession.
One advantage of this graphical representation is that one can easily track
the forecast performance of a single BE model over different sub-samples.
Remember that a value of the relative MSFE below one implies that the re-
spective model is better than the benchmark. According to Stock and Watson
(2004), one would expect the dots to cluster around the 45 degree line when
the models have a stable forecast performance. The blue dots denote the BE
models. For convenience I grouped the model pooling techniques. The red
dots represent CVMA and MMA, whereas the green dots represent AIC and
BIC model pooling. Finally, model pooling based on the MSE is in yellow
and EWA as well as the median are in purple.
As shown on the left hand side of figure 3.2, there are a some BE models
that outperform the benchmark before as well as during the crisis. Interest-
ingly, a large number of predictors which did not perform well before the
Great Recession, turn out to beat the benchmark during the Great Recession.
However, this results in the unpleasant situation in which the predictors that
work best in the period before the crisis provide a poor performance com-
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pared to the best predictors in the period during the crisis. In such an en-
vironment, model pooling techniques provide a possibility to guard against
changes in the relative forecast performance. Five out of seven pooling tech-
niques beat the benchmark model in both sub-samples.
As shown on the right had side of figure 3.2, the number of BE models
which outperform the benchmark in the period before and after the Great
Recession is very small. This finding is in line with figure 3.1. Moreover it
becomes apparent that a number of BE models locate in the upper left and
lower right quadrant, meaning that the informational content of these predic-
tor variables is different for the period before and after the Great Recession.
Interestingly, MMA and CVMA are able to outperform all BE models in the
period after the Great Recession.
So far, I only report the results for information set 9. Table 3.4 contains the
detailed results for all information sets. The upper part shows the forecast-
ing performance for the model pooling techniques in the period before the
Great Recession. A striking feature is that CVMA and MMA outperform the
other pooling techniques at all information sets. The gains compared to the
benchmark range between 10 and 20 percent, depending on the information
set. MSE weights, EWA and the median also outperform the autoregression.
However, their performance slightly lacks behind the aforementioned pool-
ing techniques. On the contrary, BIC and AIC model pooling have difficulties
in beating the benchmark model. Comparing the model pooling techniques
with the BE models, I find that CVMA and MMA perform as good as the 10th
percentile of the BE models.
The middle part of table 3.4 reports the results for the period during the
Great Recession. In this period, all considered pooling techniques are able
to outperform the benchmark model for all information sets. AIC and BIC
weights work best. However, the difference in the relative MSFE, especially
to MMA and CVMA, is not large. Compared to the BE models, the perfor-
mance of model pooling techniques lacks somewhat behind the 10th per-
centile of the BE models, especially for information sets 1 and 2 as well as
information sets 7 and 8. For these information sets, the 10th percentile BE
model has a 0.1 to 0.2 lower relative MSFE than the best model pooling tech-
nique. For the other information sets this difference is below 0.1.
Finally, the lower part of table 3.4 shows the results for the period after the
Great Recession. In this period the ranking of the model pooling techniques
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Table 3.4: Forecast performance of model pooling techniques.
IS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
h=2 h=1
Q1:2003-Q4:2007
AR(1)
MSFE MSFE
0.07 0.05
relative MSFE relative MSFE
pooling technique
CVMA 0.94 0.82 0.78 0.85 0.87 0.85 0.91 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.79 0.77
MMA 0.99 0.83 0.79 0.88 0.90 0.84 0.97 0.97 0.87 0.87 0.80 0.77
MSEw 0.96 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.90 0.89 0.99 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.87 0.86
BICw 1.14 0.95 0.89 1.01 1.06 1.01 1.04 1.01 1.05 1.05 0.85 0.85
AICw 1.06 0.99 0.91 0.99 1.07 1.02 1.02 1.00 1.08 1.02 0.85 0.84
EWA 0.99 0.96 0.93 0.91 0.91 0.90 0.98 0.96 0.92 0.91 0.87 0.87
MEDIAN 0.99 0.97 0.94 0.91 0.90 0.91 1.00 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.91 0.91
Q1:2008-Q4:2009
AR(1)
MSFE MSFE
2.69 1.68
relative MSFE relative MSFE
pooling technique
CVMA 0.81 0.73 0.60 0.58 0.58 0.50 0.85 0.87 0.46 0.47 0.24 0.24
MMA 0.84 0.78 0.63 0.61 0.63 0.57 0.82 0.81 0.48 0.49 0.26 0.26
MSEw 0.91 0.87 0.81 0.77 0.74 0.70 0.91 0.88 0.70 0.65 0.49 0.47
BICw 0.80 0.73 0.62 0.55 0.55 0.46 0.76 0.80 0.44 0.45 0.13 0.13
AICw 0.84 0.79 0.58 0.54 0.53 0.43 0.78 0.83 0.47 0.48 0.12 0.13
EWA 0.92 0.88 0.82 0.79 0.75 0.72 0.91 0.88 0.74 0.68 0.62 0.60
MEDIAN 0.94 0.93 0.87 0.82 0.80 0.78 0.92 0.90 0.80 0.77 0.76 0.75
Q1:2010-Q4:2013
AR(1)
MSFE MSFE
0.14 0.10
relative MSFE relative MSFE
pooling technique
CVMA 0.65 0.63 0.49 0.46 0.46 0.30 0.67 0.87 0.34 0.35 0.34 0.35
MMA 0.58 0.62 0.46 0.45 0.45 0.35 0.84 0.84 0.29 0.32 0.40 0.42
MSEw 0.75 0.75 0.68 0.65 0.67 0.60 0.80 0.77 0.59 0.60 0.61 0.63
BICw 0.91 1.11 0.71 0.58 0.57 0.79 0.93 1.01 0.46 0.46 1.04 1.04
AICw 0.83 1.03 0.77 0.62 0.62 0.80 0.94 1.08 0.83 0.83 1.04 1.04
EWA 0.85 0.83 0.79 0.78 0.79 0.74 0.84 0.80 0.65 0.64 0.63 0.64
MEDIAN 0.87 0.82 0.85 0.84 0.85 0.84 0.85 0.84 0.76 0.74 0.70 0.71
Notes: IS = information set, h = forecast horizon, CVMA = Cross - Validation model averaging, MMA = Mallows
model averaging, MSEw = MSE weights, BICw = BIC weights, AICw = AIC weights, EWA = equal weight
averaging, MEDIAN = median forecast.
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changes substantially compared to the period during the Great Recession.
CVMA and MMA provide the best forecast performance in this period. Ex-
cept for information set 8, these two techniques outperform all other model
pooling techniques to a quite substantial degree and, in addition, they pro-
vide more accurate forecasts than the 10th percentile of the BE models. MSE
weights as well as EWA and the median forecast also outperform the bench-
mark model for all information sets. The results for model pooling accord-
ing to the AIC and BIC results are mixed. They outperform the benchmark
only for 8 out of 12 information sets and they clearly lack behind CVMA and
MMA.
Overall, five model pooling techniques are able to outperform the bench-
mark model in all three sub-samples and at all informations sets, namely
CVMA, MMA, MSE weights, EWA and the median forecast. Out of these
five, CVMA and MMA give the most accurate forecasts. On the contrary, for
AIC and BIC model pooling the results are quite mixed. They perform well
in the period during the Great Recession, but provide very poor forecasts in
the period before the Great Recession. In the period after the Great Recession
they outperform the benchmark for 8 out of 12 information sets.
However, outperforming the ex-post best performing BE model is quite
difficult for all considered model pooling techniques. This reflects the argu-
ment put forward by Hibon and Evgeniou (2005), that model pooling does
not necessarily lead to the best possible forecast but pooling provides a viable
tool to reduce forecast risk.
3.4.3 The evolution of the model weights
In the following, I discuss the evolution of the model weights to identify
the main drivers of the pooled forecast. Therefore, I plot the average weights
assigned to each group of indicators for each information set and for the three
sub-samples in figures 3.3 to 3.7.7
With respect to the evolution of the model weights over the different in-
formation sets one would expect that some predictors are more useful at the
beginning of a forecasting round than at the end and vice versa, e.g. due to
different publication lags of the predictors or differences in the lead/lag rela-
tion between a predictor and the target variable. For the euro area, Drechsel
7EWA and the median are not discussed below because for the former the weights are
constant by definition and for the latter a single model receives a weight of one.
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and Maurin (2011) showed that the model weights indeed vary substantially
over different information sets. For my dataset the following patterns emerge
for BIC and AIC weights as well as CVMA and MMA. Surveys tend to get
high weights at the beginning and the middle of the forecasting round (in-
formation sets 1 to 8), whereas they get almost zero weight at the end of the
forecasting round (information sets 9-12). The same pattern also holds for
monetary and financial variables. On the contrary, hard business cycle indi-
cators receive the largest weights at the end of the forecasting round when
industrial production data becomes available for the current quarter. For the
CLI there is no clear pattern over the different information sets, but relatively
the indicator receives quite a large weight for nearly all information sets. In-
ternational variables play only a minor role compared to the other indicator
groups at all information sets.
Figure 3.3: Weights for BIC
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Notes: SD = Survey data, HD = Hard data, MFD = Monetary & Financial data, CLI = Com-
posite Leading Indicator, ID = International data.
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Figure 3.4: Weights for AIC
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Notes: SD = Survey data, HD = Hard data, MFD = Monetary & Financial data, CLI = Com-
posite Leading Indicator, ID = International data.
With respect to the evolution of the model weights over time one would ex-
pect that the weights assigned to a specific predictor or group of predictors
adopt according to the changes in the predictive content of the predictors as
documented in the previous section. For survey indicators the weights are in-
creasing over time. Indeed, this fits to the finding of the previous section that
the forecast performance of surveys is considerably better during the Great
Recession than before. In addition, this may also reflect the idea recently
put forward by Bloom (2009) and Baker et al. (2013) that macroeconomic un-
certainty is an important driver of business cycles. In this sense, the sharp
and persistent drop in business and consumer confidence surveys observed
in the euro area for the period during and after the Great Recession can be
interpreted as a period of high uncertainty. This argument is in line with
the findings of Bachmann et al. (2013), who showed for the United States and
Germany that survey data provides a reasonable source for measuring uncer-
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Figure 3.5: Weights for Mallows model averaging.
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Notes: SD = Survey data, HD = Hard data, MFD = Monetary & Financial data, CLI = Com-
posite Leading Indicator, ID = International data.
tainty. To a smaller extent this is also true for the international variables. The
weights increase in the periods during and after the Great Recession. This
may reflect the fact that the trade channel has become more important for
forecasting euro area GDP growth since the Great Recession due to the large
degree of synchronization of the international business cycle. For the CLI the
weights also increase over time, which is again consistent with the finding
that the performance of this indicator turns out to be quite good in the pe-
riod during the Great Recession. On the contrary, the weights for monetary
and financial indicators tend to become smaller over time except for informa-
tion set 1 and 2. Furthermore, the weights for hard business cycle indicators
become substantially smaller over time, especially for the information sets 1
to 8, while they remain important at the end of the forecasting round in all
subperiods. These observations hold for all 4 pooling techniques.
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Figure 3.6: Weights for CVMA
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Notes: SD = Survey data, HD = Hard data, MFD = Monetary & Financial data, CLI = Com-
posite Leading Indicator, ID = International data.
With respect to the forecast performance of the pooling techniques these
shifts in the model weights turn out to be quite successful for the period
during the Great Recession. CVMA, MMA as well as AIC and BIC model
weights outperform the other pooling techniques at all information sets.
However, for the period after the Great Recession there is also a prominent
difference between MMA and CVMA on the one hand and AIC and BIC
model pooling on the other hand. The latter two tend to assign very high
weights to a specific indicator group, namely monetary and financial indica-
tors and the CLI. These indicators receive high weights for information sets 1
to 2 and 3 to 5, respectively. Furthermore, surveys receive a very high weight
for information sets 6 to 8. This leads to worse forecasts for the AIC and BIC
model weights compared to CVMA and MMA for which the evolution of the
weights looks more balanced as shown in the previous section.
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Figure 3.7: Weights for MSE
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Notes: SD = Survey data, HD = Hard data, MFD = Monetary & Financial data, CLI = Com-
posite Leading Indicator, ID = International data.
MSE weights behave much different than the aforementioned pooling tech-
niques (see figure 3.7). The variability in the weights over the information
sets and over the three sub-samples is extremely small and mirrors to a large
extent the share of the predictor groups in the overall sample. This explains
why the forecast performance of MSE weight is in fact very similar to the
performance the EWA.
3.4.4 Is model selection a viable alternative to model
pooling?
The above analysis documented the usefulness of model pooling techniques
in outperforming the benchmark model. However, in the most cases there
exist a single predictor BE model that outperforms all model pooling tech-
niques. This finding suggests that model selection might be a promising
90
Table 3.5: Forecast performance of model selection.
IS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
h=2 h=1
Q1:2003-Q4:2007
AR(1)
MSFE MSFE
0.07 0.05
relative MSFE relative MSFE
CVMAsel 1.29 1.54 1.37 1.57 1.20 1.84 1.81 1.76 1.18 1.47 1.28 1.23
MMAsel 1.98 0.97 0.96 1.92 1.93 1.69 1.53 1.72 1.06 1.23 1.17 1.37
MSEsel 1.39 1.18 1.13 1.00 1.21 1.20 1.49 1.55 0.99 1.28 1.24 1.23
BICsel 1.46 1.38 1.09 1.26 1.32 1.14 1.51 1.40 1.18 1.37 0.96 1.05
AICsel 1.64 1.38 1.24 1.23 1.22 1.13 1.32 1.36 1.36 1.21 0.90 0.99
Q1:2008-Q4:2009
AR(1)
MSFE MSFE
2.69 1.68
relative MSFE relative MSFE
CVMAsel 0.68 0.70 0.52 0.52 0.48 0.51 0.80 0.84 0.48 0.48 0.21 0.23
MMAsel 0.87 0.87 0.73 0.48 0.48 0.53 0.79 0.85 0.48 0.48 0.20 0.19
MSEsel 0.92 0.91 0.76 0.49 0.64 0.61 1.05 1.02 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.95
BICsel 0.80 0.70 0.73 0.49 0.49 0.41 0.79 0.82 0.53 0.53 0.11 0.11
AICsel 0.82 0.87 0.50 0.50 0.48 0.34 0.79 0.86 0.50 0.50 0.11 0.11
Q1:2010-Q4:2013
AR(1)
MSFE MSFE
0.14 0.10
relative MSFE relative MSFE
CVMAsel 0.80 0.84 0.80 0.80 0.80 1.21 1.35 1.19 1.01 1.09 1.14 1.20
MMAsel 1.11 1.11 0.80 0.86 0.86 0.99 0.96 1.22 1.01 1.05 1.05 1.01
MSEsel 2.35 1.95 1.93 1.89 1.95 1.98 1.22 1.36 1.63 1.57 1.49 1.51
BICsel 1.08 1.39 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.99 0.96 1.07 0.96 0.96 1.04 1.04
AICsel 1.30 1.39 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.99 0.96 1.07 0.98 0.98 1.04 1.04
Notes: The model with the largest weight is selected. CVMAsel = Cross - Validation model selection, MMAsel =
Mallows model selection, MSEsel = MSE selection, BICsel = BIC selection, AICsel = AIC selection.
alternative to pooling. However, knowing the ex-post best performing BE
model does not necessarily mean that a forecaster is able to select this model
in real-time. To shed light on this issue, I also report the results based on
model selection of one of the 39 BE models. For simplicity, I follow Kuzin
et al. (2013) and select the model which receives the largest weight in the
pooled forecast.
As shown in table 3.5, model selection works very badly in the period be-
fore the Great Recession. The relative MSFE is in most cases larger than unity.
On the contrary, in the period during the Great Recession relative forecast
performance improves substantially and is close to the forecast performance
of the respective pooling techniques. In the period after the Great Recession
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the forecast performance of model selection deteriorates again. In most cases
the relative MSFE is larger than unity and the gains obtained for some in-
formation sets are behind the gains of model pooling. Given these results, I
conclude that model selection is a very risky choice when the informational
content of single predictors is subject to considerable changes.
3.5 Conclusions
In this paper, I analyse the performance of BE models as well as model se-
lection and model pooling techniques for forecasting euro area GDP growth.
I show that there is a substantial variation in the informational content of
single predictor BE models. Depending on the information set, only 5 to 15
percent of the predictors outperform the benchmark model in the periods
before, during and after the Great Recession. Moreover, I find that model
selection does not provide a safeguard against the variation in the informa-
tional content of single predictor variables. In the periods before and after
the Great Recession model selection techniques are not able to outperform
the benchmark model in most cases. On the contrary, model pooling is quite
robust against changes in the informational content. Five out of seven pool-
ing techniques outperform the benchmark model in all sub-samples. Out of
these five, CVMA and MMA are the most accurate model pooling techniques
in terms of the relative MSFE.
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Table 3.6: The dataset
No. Variable name Label Data transformation publishing lag at Source Datastream Code
log 1st diff. 5th day 20th day
I. Survey data (SD) (N=10)
1. Economic Sentiment ESI no yes 1 1 EU Commission EKEUSESIG
2. Consumer Confidence CC no yes 1 1 EU Commission EKCNFCONQ
3. Industry Sector Confidence IC no yes 1 1 EU Commission EKCNFBUSQ
4. Retail Sector Confidence RC no yes 1 1 EU Commission EKTTR99BQ
5. Construction Sector Confidence CSTC no yes 1 1 EU Commission EK45.99BQ
6. Business Climate BC no yes 1 1 EU Commission EKEUBCI.R
7. Employment Expectations, Consumers CCemex no yes 1 1 EU Commission EKTOT7BSQ
8. Employment Expectations, Industry ICemex no yes 1 1 EU Commission EKEUIMF7Q
9. Employment Expectations, Retail RCemex no yes 1 1 EU Commission EKTTR5BSQ
10. Employment Expectations, Construction CSTCemex no yes 1 1 EU Commission EK45.4BSQ
II. Hard data (HD) (N=11)
11. Industrial Production, ex. Construction IPtot yes yes 3 2 EUROSTAT EKIPTOT.G
12. Industrial Production, Manufacturing IPman yes yes 3 2 EUROSTAT EKIPMAN.G
13. Industrial Production, Construction IPcons yes yes 3 2 EUROSTAT EKESCONMG
14. Industrial Production, Energy IPener yes yes 3 2 EUROSTAT EKESIENGG
15. Industrial Production, Intermediate Goods IPint yes yes 3 2 EUROSTAT EKESIITRG
16. Industrial Production, Capital Goods IPcap yes yes 3 2 EUROSTAT EKESICTLG
17. Industrial Production, Consumer Durables IPcd yes yes 3 2 EUROSTAT EKESICODG
18. Industrial Production, Consumer Non-Durables IPcnd yes yes 3 2 EUROSTAT EKESICNDG
19. Unemployment Rate EAUN no yes 2 2 EUROSTAT EKESUNEMO
20. Retail Sales Volume RS yes yes 2 2 EUROSTAT EMRETTOTG
21. New Passenger Car Registrations CARS yes yes 2 1 ECB EKEBCARRO
III. Monetary & Financial data (MFD) (N=7)
22. 10-Year Government Bond Yield GOVbond no yes 1 1 ECB EMGBOND.
23. Euro STOXX Index EUSTOXX yes yes 1 1 STOXX DJEURST
24. M1 M1 yes yes 2 2 ECB EMM1....B
25. M3 M3 yes yes 2 2 ECB EMM3....B
26. Effective Exchange Rate, 12 Partners, Real REER yes yes 1 1 ECB EMECBRCCR
27. Effective Exchange Rate, 12 Partners, Nominal NEER yes yes 1 1 ECB EMECBNOCR
28. $ - Euro Exchange Rate EDER yes yes 1 1 ECB EMXRUSD
IV. Composite Leading Indicator (CLI) (N=1)
29. OECD Composite Leading Indicator EACLI yes yes 3 3 OECD EKOL2001T
V. International data (ID) (N=10)
30. World Trade, CPB CPBWT yes yes 3 3 CPB WDCPBTBWG
31. US, OECD Composite Leading Indicator USCLI yes yes 3 3 OECD USCYLEADT
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32. US, Industrial Production USIP yes yes 3 2 Federal Reserve USIPTOT.G
33. US, Unemployment Rate USUN no yes 2 1 BLS USUN%TOTQ
34. UK, OECD Composite Leading Indicator UKCLI yes yes 3 3 OECD UKCYLEADT
35. UK, Industrial Production UKIP yes yes 3 2 ONS UKIPTOT.G
36. UK, Unemployment Rate UKUN no yes 2 1 ONS UKUN%TOTQ
37. JP, OECD Composite Leading Indicator JPCLI yes yes 3 3 OECD JPOL2001T
38. JP, Industrial Production JPIP yes yes 3 2 Ministry of Economy, JPIPTOT.G
Trade and Industry
39. JP, Unemployment Rate JPUN no yes 2 2 Statistics Bureau JPUN%TOTQ
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Table 3.7: Forecast evaluation of all BE models for the period before the Great
Recession (Q1:2003-Q4:2007).
IS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
h=2 h=1
AR(1)
MSFE MSFE
0.07 0.05
relative MSFE relative MSFE
SD
ESI 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.88 0.88 0.88 1.01 1.03 1.03 1.02 1.02 1.02
CC 0.69 0.72 0.72 0.71 0.71 0.77 0.96 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.94
IC 1.18 1.15 1.15 1.07 1.07 1.12 1.17 1.07 1.07 1.04 1.04 1.04
RC 0.97 0.94 0.94 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.96 0.86 0.86 0.87 0.87 0.87
CSTC 0.79 0.91 0.91 1.01 1.01 1.01 0.98 0.98 0.98 1.09 1.09 1.09
BC 1.26 1.16 1.16 1.16 1.16 1.04 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.05 1.05 1.05
CCemex 0.78 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.89 1.14 1.01 1.01 0.96 0.96 0.96
ICemex 1.11 1.09 1.09 1.02 1.02 0.97 1.15 1.06 1.06 0.98 0.98 0.98
RCemex 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.92 1.00 1.02 1.02 1.04 1.04 1.04
CSTCemex 1.22 1.21 1.21 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.24 0.98 0.98 0.92 0.92 0.92
HD
IPtot 1.03 1.03 1.07 1.07 1.06 1.06 1.40 1.40 1.31 1.31 1.02 1.02
IPman 1.05 1.05 0.98 0.98 1.07 1.07 1.49 1.49 1.24 1.24 0.78 0.78
IPcons 1.03 1.03 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.04 0.94 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.87 0.87
IPener 1.06 1.06 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.03 1.03 1.07 1.07 1.04 1.04
IPint 1.22 1.22 1.11 1.11 1.41 1.41 1.60 1.60 1.14 1.14 1.18 1.18
IPcap 1.03 1.03 1.17 1.17 1.20 1.20 1.28 1.28 1.20 1.20 0.93 0.93
IPcd 1.05 1.05 1.12 1.12 0.98 0.98 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.18 0.90 0.90
IPcnd 1.16 1.16 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77
EAUN 1.07 0.90 0.90 1.00 1.00 0.85 1.11 1.25 1.25 1.27 1.27 1.14
RS 0.90 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.04 1.03 1.11 1.11 1.09 1.09 1.04
CARS 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 0.79 0.79 0.85 0.85 0.86 0.86
MFD
GOVbond 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.07 1.07 0.95 1.01 0.84 0.84 0.85 0.85 0.85
EUSTOXX 0.75 0.76 0.76 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77
M1 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 1.04 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76
M3 1.31 1.22 1.22 1.16 1.16 1.20 1.21 1.21 1.21 1.21 1.21 1.21
REER 1.34 1.36 1.36 1.34 1.34 1.34 1.28 1.28 1.28 1.28 1.28 1.28
NEER 1.34 1.37 1.37 1.35 1.35 1.35 1.30 1.30 1.30 1.30 1.30 1.30
EDER 1.21 1.21 1.21 1.21 1.21 1.21 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20
CLI
EACLI 1.30 1.30 1.23 1.23 1.23 1.23 1.40 1.40 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.06
98
ID
CPBWT 1.21 1.14 1.14 1.21 1.21 1.20 1.32 1.24 1.24 1.28 1.28 0.93
USCLI 1.26 1.26 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.11 1.11 1.11 1.11
USIP 1.06 1.06 1.12 1.12 1.10 1.10 1.31 1.31 1.07 1.07 1.13 1.13
USUN 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86
UKCLI 1.16 1.16 1.30 1.30 1.30 1.30 1.19 1.19 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.15
UKIP 1.31 1.31 1.16 1.16 0.93 0.93 1.12 1.12 1.06 1.06 1.13 1.13
UKUN 1.53 1.53 1.41 1.41 1.43 1.43 1.37 1.37 1.37 1.37 1.37 1.37
JPCLI 1.19 1.19 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05
JPIP 1.24 1.15 1.15 0.99 0.99 0.93 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
JPUN 1.27 1.27 1.27 1.27 1.27 1.27 1.34 1.31 1.31 1.38 1.38 1.39
Notes: SD = Survey data, HD = Hard data, MFD = Monetary & Financial data, CLI =
Composite Leading Indicator, ID = International data; indicator labels are explained in
table 3.6.
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Table 3.8: Forecast evaluation of all BE models for the period during the Great
Recession (Q1:2008-Q4:2009).
IS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
h=2 h=1
AR(1)
MSFE MSFE
2.69 1.68
relative MSFE relative MSFE
SD
ESI 0.63 0.59 0.59 0.54 0.54 0.49 0.70 0.67 0.67 0.66 0.66 0.66
CC 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.57 0.57 0.54 0.79 0.74 0.74 0.71 0.71 0.71
IC 0.66 0.57 0.57 0.52 0.52 0.50 0.67 0.61 0.61 0.62 0.62 0.62
RC 0.89 0.83 0.83 0.77 0.77 0.68 0.89 0.87 0.87 0.86 0.86 0.86
CSTC 0.87 0.82 0.82 0.76 0.76 0.71 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.80 0.80 0.80
BC 0.72 0.61 0.61 0.55 0.55 0.48 0.62 0.60 0.60 0.57 0.57 0.57
CCemex 0.72 0.63 0.63 0.58 0.58 0.50 0.72 0.64 0.64 0.60 0.60 0.60
ICemex 0.77 0.67 0.67 0.54 0.54 0.47 0.77 0.64 0.64 0.58 0.58 0.58
RCemex 1.00 0.93 0.93 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.94 0.85 0.85 0.77 0.77 0.77
HD
IPtot 1.05 1.05 0.89 0.89 0.69 0.69 1.15 1.15 0.49 0.49 0.17 0.17
IPman 1.06 1.06 0.82 0.82 0.67 0.67 1.30 1.30 0.34 0.34 0.11 0.11
IPcons 1.05 1.05 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.16 1.16 0.91 0.91 0.94 0.94
IPener 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.04 1.04 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.07
IPint 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.70 0.70 1.14 1.14 0.34 0.34 0.19 0.19
IPcap 0.91 0.91 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.98 0.98 0.47 0.47 0.21 0.21
IPcd 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.04 0.72 0.72 1.01 1.01 0.96 0.96 0.52 0.52
IPcnd 1.02 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 0.99 0.99 0.91 0.91
EAUN 1.02 0.90 0.90 0.68 0.68 0.67 1.09 0.80 0.80 0.66 0.66 0.48
RS 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.89 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.07
CARS 0.93 0.93 0.90 0.90 0.92 0.92 0.82 0.82 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.90
MFD
GOVbond 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.01 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
EUSTOXX 0.62 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70
M1 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.79 0.83 0.83 0.82 0.82 0.82
M3 0.92 0.91 0.91 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85
REER 1.05 1.06 1.06 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.11 1.11 1.11 1.11 1.11 1.11
NEER 1.04 1.05 1.05 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02
EDER 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.96 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99
CLI
EACLI 1.01 1.01 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.87 0.87 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35
ID
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CPBWT 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.91 1.21 1.16 1.16 0.54 0.54 0.33
USCLI 1.23 1.23 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 1.10 1.10 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72
USIP 0.99 0.99 0.93 0.93 0.82 0.82 0.59 0.59 0.68 0.68 0.67 0.67
USUN 1.12 1.12 1.17 1.17 1.21 1.21 1.04 1.04 1.05 1.05 1.02 1.02
UKCLI 1.16 1.16 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.92 0.92 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59
UKIP 1.22 1.22 0.90 0.90 0.82 0.82 0.99 0.99 0.76 0.76 0.64 0.64
UKUN 1.02 1.02 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.96 0.94 0.94 0.84 0.84 0.78 0.78
JPCLI 1.08 1.08 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.07 1.07 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95
JPIP 1.33 0.94 0.94 0.89 0.89 0.81 1.58 0.96 0.96 0.37 0.37 0.25
JPUN 1.01 0.92 0.92 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.04 1.04 1.02 1.02 1.01
Notes: SD = Survey data, HD = Hard data, MFD = Monetary & Financial data, CLI =
Composite Leading Indicator, ID = International data; indicator labels are explained in
table 3.6.
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Table 3.9: Forecast evaluation of all BE models for the period after the Great
Recession (Q1:2010-Q4:2013).
IS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
h=2 h=1
AR(1)
MSFE MSFE
0.14 0.10
relative MSFE relative MSFE
SD
ESI 0.89 0.88 0.88 0.87 0.87 0.62 0.88 0.95 0.95 1.03 1.03 1.03
CC 1.03 1.01 1.01 1.15 1.15 0.96 0.99 1.18 1.18 1.25 1.25 1.25
IC 0.87 1.03 1.03 1.04 1.04 0.75 0.85 0.94 0.94 0.98 0.98 0.98
RC 0.90 0.75 0.75 0.77 0.77 0.89 0.91 0.94 0.94 1.01 1.01 1.01
CSTC 1.35 1.38 1.38 1.27 1.27 1.17 1.03 1.02 1.02 0.98 0.98 0.98
BC 1.06 1.15 1.15 1.12 1.12 0.99 0.90 1.07 1.07 1.16 1.16 1.16
CCemex 1.23 1.21 1.21 1.21 1.21 1.15 1.17 1.27 1.27 1.30 1.30 1.30
ICemex 1.12 1.18 1.18 1.19 1.19 1.23 1.14 0.96 0.96 1.09 1.09 1.09
RCemex 0.86 0.71 0.71 0.70 0.70 0.78 0.86 0.85 0.85 1.03 1.03 1.03
CSTCemex 1.58 1.53 1.53 1.43 1.43 0.97 0.86 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80
HD
IPtot 2.61 2.61 1.12 1.12 1.32 1.32 1.29 1.29 1.02 1.02 1.08 1.08
IPman 2.78 2.78 3.13 3.13 1.48 1.48 1.30 1.30 0.85 0.85 1.04 1.04
IPcons 0.97 0.97 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 1.00 1.00 0.88 0.88 0.97 0.97
IPener 1.11 1.11 1.11 1.11 1.10 1.10 0.79 0.79 1.45 1.45 0.79 0.79
IPint 2.32 2.32 1.44 1.44 1.56 1.56 1.44 1.44 0.73 0.73 0.81 0.81
IPcap 2.48 2.48 2.86 2.86 3.57 3.57 1.44 1.44 1.21 1.21 1.13 1.13
IPcd 1.36 1.36 1.34 1.34 1.58 1.58 1.10 1.10 1.30 1.30 1.57 1.57
IPcnd 0.86 0.86 1.12 1.12 1.14 1.14 1.15 1.15 1.37 1.37 1.28 1.28
EAUN 1.15 1.53 1.53 1.59 1.59 1.66 1.12 1.50 1.50 1.64 1.64 1.46
RS 1.11 1.11 1.11 1.11 1.11 1.08 1.10 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 0.96
CARS 1.05 1.05 1.25 1.25 1.19 1.19 1.13 1.13 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91
MFD
GOVbond 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82
EUSTOXX 1.08 1.23 1.23 1.26 1.26 1.26 1.32 1.14 1.14 1.17 1.17 1.17
M1 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64
M3 2.18 1.80 1.80 1.77 1.77 1.74 1.48 1.52 1.52 1.48 1.48 1.48
REER 1.19 1.19 1.19 1.19 1.19 1.19 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.15
NEER 1.22 1.22 1.22 1.22 1.22 1.22 1.19 1.19 1.19 1.19 1.19 1.19
EDER 1.14 1.14 1.14 1.14 1.14 1.14 1.21 1.21 1.21 1.21 1.21 1.21
CLI
EACLI 1.32 1.32 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01
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ID
CPBWT 1.46 1.16 1.16 1.16 1.16 1.37 1.20 1.20 1.20 0.60 0.60 0.82
USCLI 0.97 0.97 1.45 1.45 1.45 1.45 0.98 0.98 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92
USIP 1.91 1.91 1.93 1.93 1.89 1.89 1.55 1.55 1.53 1.53 1.48 1.48
USUN 1.85 1.85 2.35 2.35 2.71 2.71 1.49 1.49 1.68 1.68 1.77 1.77
UKCLI 1.02 1.02 1.76 1.76 1.76 1.76 1.05 1.05 1.34 1.34 1.34 1.34
UKIP 1.02 1.02 1.15 1.15 1.06 1.06 0.95 0.95 0.59 0.59 0.66 0.66
UKUN 1.58 1.58 1.44 1.44 1.45 1.45 1.02 1.02 1.03 1.03 1.09 1.09
JPCLI 1.34 1.34 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 1.11 1.11 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91
JPIP 1.38 1.12 1.12 1.15 1.15 1.14 1.07 1.34 1.34 1.19 1.19 1.50
JPUN 0.93 1.04 1.04 0.87 0.87 0.90 1.04 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94
Notes: SD = Survey data, HD = Hard data, MFD = Monetary & Financial data, CLI =
Composite Leading Indicator, ID = International data; indicator labels are explained in
table 3.6.
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Figure 3.8: Relative MSFE comparison before and during the crisis, h=2
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Notes: Blue dots: single indicator models, red dots: CV and Mallows model averaging, yel-
low dot: MSE weights, green dots: BIC and AIC weights, green circle: BIC model selection,
purple dots: equal weight averaging and median.
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Figure 3.9: Relative MSFE comparison before and during the crisis, h=1
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Notes: Blue dots: single indicator models, red dots: CV and Mallows model averaging, yel-
low dot: MSE weights, green dots: BIC and AIC weights, green circle: BIC model selection,
purple dots: equal weight averaging and median.
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Figure 3.10: Relative MSFE comparison before and after the crisis, h=2
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averaging and median.
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Figure 3.11: Relative MSFE comparison before and after the crisis, h=1
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averaging and median.
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